Intuitionistic logic in intuitionistic metamathematics by Swart, H.C.M. de
INTUmONISTIC LOGIC IN 
INTUITIONISTIC METAMATHEMATICS 
H.C.M. DE SWART 

INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC IN 
INTUITIONISTIC METAMATH E MAT ICS 
PROMOTOR: 
PROF. J.J. DEIONGH 
INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC IN 
INTUITIONISTIC METAMATH E MAT ICS 
P R O E F S C H R I F T 
TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR 
IN DE WISKUNDE EN NATUURWETENSCHAPPEN 
AAN DE KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT TE NIJMEGEN, OP GEZAG VAN 
DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS PROF. DR. A.J.H. VENDRIK, 
VOLGENS BESLUIT VAN HET COLLEGE VAN DECANEN 
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN 
OP VRIJDAG 2 APRIL 1976 
DES NAMIDDAGS TE 14.00 UUR PRECIES 
door 
HENRICUS CORNELIUS MARIA QE SWART 
geboren te Tilburg 
Druk: Offsetdrukkerij Faculteit der Wiskunde en Natuurwetenschappen 
Nijmegen 

Aan mijn ouders en aan Regina 
I like to express my sincere thanks to all people of the group 
'foundations and philosophy of mathematics' in Nijmegen and to 
Dr. D. van Dalen (Utrecht) for countlessly many discussions and 
suggestions and for creating the atmosphere, in which this disserta-
tion could be written. 
I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr. M. Dummett (Oxford), 
Prof.Dr. G. Kreisel (Stanford) and Prof.Dr. A. Troelstra (Amster-
dam) for their friendly interest in my work and for stimulating 
discussions, both orally and in writing. 
This thesis could not have been written without the hospitality of 
the Mathematical Institute (1966-1971) and of the Philosophical 
Institute (since 1971) in Nijmegen. 
I wish to express my appreciation to Mrs. E.L.M. Remers-Dreuning 
for her excellent typing of the thesis and to the whole production 
team of Mr. J.M. Geertsen for printing this thesis. 
C O N T E N T S 
Introduction 1 
Chapter I. An intuitionistically plausible 
interpretation of intuitionistic logic. 7 
§1. Models for the intuitionistic propositional 
calculus; Motivation. 7 
§2. Models for the intuitionistic predicate calculus. 16 
§3. Soundness, completeness and compactness. 25 
54. Completeness, Markov's principle and Church's 
Thesis. 34 
Chapter II. An intuitionistic proof of the 
completeness theorem. 37 
51. Proof Theory. 38 
52. Systematic Procedure for searching derivations. 46 
53. Soundness and Completeness. 57 
Chapter III. First Steps in Intuitionistic 
Modeltheory. 68 
51. Submodels; Deduction theorem; The model 
R(M , M , s) ; Disjunction property ; Explicit 
о 
definability theorem. 70 
52. The model .Z M. ; Uniformity properties; 
Compactness theorems. 81 
§3. The semantic independence of the intuitionistic 
connectives. 88 
Chapter IV. A First Step towards an Interpretation of 
Intuitionistic Logic in Intuitionistic 
Analysis. 94 
51. Intuitionistic propositional calculus 95 
52. Intuitionistic predicate calculus. 100 
§3. Discussion. 103- 104 
References 105-106-107 
Notations 108-109 
Subject Index 110-111 
Samenvatting 112 
Curriculum Vitae 113 
1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Let IPC be the intuitionistic first-order predicate 
calculus. From the definition of derivability in IPC the 
following is clear: 
(1) If A is derivable in IPC, denoted by " bl A", then A 
is intuitively true, that means, true according to the 
intuitionistic interpretation of the logical symbols. 
To be able to settle the converse question: 
"if A is intuitively true, then h¡rpr A", one should 
make the notion of intuitionistic truth more easily 
amenable to mathematical treatment. So we have to look 
then for a definition of "A is valid", denoted by 
" ^ =А", such that the following holds: 
(2) If A is intuitively true, then И^ A. 
And then one might hope to be able to prove 
(3) If H A , then ^
c
 A. 
If one would succeed in finding a notion of " f= A", 
such that all the conditions (1), (2) and (3) are 
satisfied, then the chain would be closed, i.e. all the 
arrows in the scheme below would hold. 
I— A » A is intuitively true 
1= A 
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Several suggestions for H A have been made in the past: 
Topological and algebraic interpretations, see Rasiowa 
and Sikorski [ 1 ]. 
The intuitionistic models of Beth, see [2] and [3] . 
The interpretation of Grzegorczyk, see [4] and [5]. 
The models of Kripke, see [6] and [7]. 
In "Thirty years of foundational studies" A. Mostowski 
([8]) gives a review of the interpretations, proposed for 
intuitionistic logic, on pp. 90-98. 
In this paper we consider another truth-definition for 
formulas of intuitionistic predicate calculus. The main 
difference between the models treated here and Beth- and 
Kripke-models is, that in the new models validity is 
defined by validity in the elements of a spread, while in 
Beth- and Kripke-models validity is defined by validity in 
the nodes of some partially ordered set. It turns out that 
defining validity, as proposed in this paper, has several 
advantages. 
Working with the new notion of validity ( in 
completeness theorems and in modeltheory), we will use 
intuitionistic metamathematics, contrary to the custom to 
treat semantics for intuitionistic logic in a classical 
way. 
Let A = A(P , ..., Ρ ) be a sentence, built from the 
predicate-symbols P., ..., P. and from individual-symbols 
in the usual way. 
By the structural validity of A we mean that for each 
domain D (for example D = IN or D is some spread) and for 
* * 
all predicates Ρ , ..., Ρ over D, the concrete sentence 
* *
 1
 *
 K 
A = A(P , ..., P. ), which results from A by interpreting 
3 
the individual-symbols in A as elements (individuals) of D 
and by interpreting the predicate symbols Ρ , ..., P. as 
* * I K 
the predicates Ρ , ..., Ρ over D, is true. 
From the definition of derivability in IPC it is clear that 
IPC is sound with respect to this notion of structural 
validity: 
(i) If A is derivable in IPC, then A is structurally valid. 
The notion of structural validity contains a quantification 
over all domains D and a quantification over all predicates 
* * 
Ρ , ..., Ρ over D. 
Although these quantifications are not quantifications over 
IN or over a spread, we can give a clear interpretation of 
the meaning of the soundness-statement (i), because the 
quantifications occur in the succèdent of the implication. 
Because in the converse statement "if A is structurally 
valid, then A is derivable" the quantifications in the 
notion of structural validity occur in the antecedent of the 
implication, it is much more problematic to understand the 
meaning of this statement. 
However, in this paper we will develop a notion of a model, 
in which all individual symbols are interpreted as individ-
uals (elements) of IN. 
A model M will interprete an m-ary predicate-symbol Ρ as a 
* 
predicate Ρ over the natural numbers and at the same time 
will give for each m-tuple <n,, ..., η > of natural numbers 
1 m 
a possible development of our knowledge about the proposition 
* 
Ρ (η., ..., η ). It turns out that these models form a fan 1 m 
W and " |=A" will mean that A holds in all models of W. 
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So, in the notion of " ^  A", we have a quantification 
over a fan and hence we have a precisely defined intuitio-
nistic construction as interpretation of the completeness-
statement. 
(ii) if N A, then A is derivable in IPC. 
In the modeltheory, presented here, I also apply an 
idea of W. Veldman, see [10] , which enabled him to give an 
intuitionistically correct proof of the completeness theorem 
for Kripke-models. 
The idea is not to restrict ourselves to the consider-
ation of non-exploding models, but also to consider 
exploding models, where a Kripke-model is called exploding, 
if the false formula "f" does hold in it somewhere. This 
idea seems to give an interpretation of negation, which is 
nearer to what Brouwer really meant by negation: I may 
discover at some moment that my presuppositions yield 
absurdity, and hence everything. 
It should be noted, that already E.W. Beth himself has 
felt in one way or another the necessity to consider a larger 
class of models than one usually does. In his book "The 
foundations of mathematics", page 461, [14], he speaks rather 
vaguely about semi-models and remarks that the completeness 
theorem can be intuitionistically proved, if one considers 
the larger set of all semi-models instead of the class of 
all models. 
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It turns out that the notion of validity, which will be 
introduced in chapter I, section 1 and 2, offers several 
advantages, compared with the other notions of validity. 
These advantages will be indicated at the appropriate places, 
namely in 
Remark A, before example 1.5, chapter I 
Remark B, after lemma 2.4, chapter I 
Remark C, after theorem 3.2, chapter I 
In chapter I we define in section 1 our notion of validity 
for the formulas of the intuitionistic prepositional 
calculus and give the motivation for this definition. In 
section 2 we extend this definition to the predicate calcu-
lus. In section 3 we sketch two different proofs of the 
completeness theorem. Also two versions of the compactness 
theorem are proved and, using Brouwer's Continuity Principle, 
the formal equivalence of a Beth-model and of a model, in the 
sense of this paper is shown. 
In section 4 we discuss the relation between our completeness 
result, Markov's principle and Church's Thesis . 
In chapter II a detailed proof of the completeness theorem 
(in intuitionistic metamathematics) is given, using ideas 
of W. Veldman [ 10] and M. Fitting [ 18]. 
In chapter III "First Steps in Intuitionistic Modeltheory" 
we will do some modeltheory with respect to the models, 
defined in chapter I, and, as in the other chapters, all 
our metamathematical results will be proved in intuitionistic 
metamathematics. In section 1 we will give intuitionistically 
correct proofs of some theorems, which were already proved 
6 
in classical metamathematics (see C.A. Smorynski [17]), e.g. 
the disjunction property and the explicit definability 
theorem. Let W be the fan of all models and let Γ be a 
countably infinite sequence of sentences. Then we will see 
in section 2 that 
(i) ( А )
д е Г
 (EM) M e w (notM^A) iff 
Mew (A) (not M |= A) 
( І І ) ( M )M6W ( Е А )А6Г ( M h - A ) i f f 
(EA)Aer(M)Mew ( M ^ A ) 
In chapter I, section 3, two compactness theorems are 
proved. In section 2 of chapter III we prove some other 
compactness results. The independence of the intuitionistic 
connectives is studied in section 3 of chapter III. 
Kripke has shown (see [6 ], page 100) that his notion of 
validity can readily be formulated in terms of Kreisel's 
theory FC of absolutely free choice sequences. In chapter IV 
we will formulate our notion of validity in terms of 
intuitionistic analysis, not using, as Kripke does, axioms 
about absolutely free choice sequences. 
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I AN I N T U I T I O N I S T I C A L L Y 
P L A U S I B L E I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F 
I N T U I T I O N I S T I C L O G I C 
§1. Models for the i n t u i t i o n i s t i c p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s ; 
Motivation. 
For s i m p l i c i t y we s t a r t with the i n t u i t i o n i s t i c 
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c a l c u l u s . 
Suppose our language c o n s i s t s of the following symbols: 
P. f β. ι *p ' on ' . . . . \ 
V propositional symbols 
f (falsity) ' 
V, &, ->· connectives. 
If A is a formula, we define - A = A ->• f. 
σ = {0,1} , more precisely: σ is the binary fan of all 
infinite sequences of zero's and one's. 
σ
ηι „,„„ S { α ε σηι? (η)(α(η+1) > α(η))}. 01 mon D 01 -
Let PS denote the set of all propositional symbols. 
Now, we first state the definitions. Afterwards we will give 
an elaborate motivation. 
Definition 1.1: A model M is a dressed spread <S„,T„>, where 
M M 
S„ ,the spreadlaw, regulates the choices of natural numbers, 
M 
while Τ ,the complementary law, assigns to each finite 
M 
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sequence, which is admissible according to the spread-law 
S
w
 , a mapping from PS to {0,1} , such that for every Q.e PS 
M 
if Τ (<a , ..., a >) (Q) = 1, then Τ (<a , ..., a ,a >) (Q) 
Μ υ η м υ η n+i 
= 1. 
If ο is an infinitely proceeding sequence admitted by 
S then M : PS -ν σ is defined by M (Q)(k) = Τ (ok)(Q). 
If no confusion is possible, we will sometimes use 
"admissible" instead of "admitted by S ,". 
M 
Remark: It will turn out that we can restrict ourselves to 
models M = <S,T >, where S is one fixed spread-law for all M 
M, for example S is the universal spread-law· 
Definition 1.2: Let M be a model <S ,T > and let α be an M M 
infinitely proceeding sequence, admitted by S . 
M 
M И f = for some к e IN, M (f)(к) = 1 . 
M И= A = 
α D 
1. M N= f or 
α 
2. A = Ρ and for some к e IN, M (Ρ)(к) = 1 or 
3. A = В V С and (M |= В or M 1= С) or 
4. A = В а С and (M К В and M И С) or 
α α 
5. Α = Β -»• С and there is some к e IN, such that for all 
admissible infinitely proceeding sequences 0, 
if 3k = oik and M. t= B, then M. H C . 
ρ Ρ 
Notice, that if M И f, then Μ N A for all formulas A. 
α α 
Definition 1.3: Let M be a model <S
m
, , Τ >. 
M M 
M t= A = M |= A for all infinitely proceeding sequences α# 
admitted by S
w
 . 
M 
Notice, that M i=- В -*- С iff for all admissible ¡χ, if 
Μ |= В, then M |= С. 
α α 
Lemma 1.4; Let Μ be a model and α an infinitely proceeding 
sequence, admitted by S . 
M 
M |= A iff there is some к e IN, such that for all admissible 
a 
infinitely proceeding sequences 3, if $k = ôik, then 
Μ
β
Η A. 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
Although in lemma 1.4 the validity in admissible infinitely 
proceeding sequences is reduced to validity in finite 
sequences of natural numbers, it turns out that the notion 
of validity, as defined in this paper (definition 2.8), 
offers several advantages, compared with the (generalized) 
notions of validity of Beth and Kripke, as will be indicated 
in the remarks А, В and С in this chapter, before example 
1.5, after lemma 2.4 and after theorem 3.2, respectively. 
Motivation of definition 1.1 and 1.2: 
Intuitively, a model M assigns to each propositional 
variable Ρ a basic-sentence M(P) over the natural numbers 
and hence to each formula A a sentence M(A) over the natural 
numbers, namely M(B 6 C) = M(B) & M(C) 
M(B ν C) = M(B) ν M(C) 
M(B •+• C) = M(B) -*• M(C) 
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and gives at the same time a possible development of our 
knowledge about those sentences. 
More precisely, there is a spread of possibilities to 
search for a proof of M(A), each search-path a in the spread 
representing a set of presuppositions for M(A). 
Searching along one possible path α we write 
M (A)(i) = 1 if I have found a proof of M(A) at the time i, 
searching along the path a. 
and M (A)(i) = 0 if I have not found a proof of M(A) at the 
α 
time i, searching along the path a. 
Now, let M И A denote that searching along the path α 
I find a proof of M(A), i.e. M (A)(i) = 1 for some i. 
Given a model M and a path a, along which we search 
for a proof of Μ(A), the following conditions should be 
satisfied: 
Μ Η"- В & С iff searching along α I find a proof of M(B & C) 
iff searching along α I find a proof of M(B) and 
searching along a I find a proof of M(C) 
iff M И В and M И С 
α α 
M |= В V С iff searching along α I find a proof of M(B V C) 
iff searching along α I find a proof of M(B) or 
searching along α I find a proof of M(C) 
iff Μ Η В or M И С 
α α 
M t= В •+• С iff searching along α I find a proof of 
M(B) -*- M(C) 
iff searching along a there is some i such that 
I have a proof of M(B) -*• M(C) at time i. 
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To have a proof of M(B) -> M(C) at time i along the 
search-path α means that as soon as I have a proof of M(B) 
along the search-path o, I also have a proof of M(C) along 
a. Moreover: if the search-path 0 equals the search path α 
up till i, this means that also along the search-path 3 I 
have a proof of M(B) •*• M(C) at time i, and hence, for each 
such 3, if I have a proof of M(B) along 3, then I also have 
a proof of M(C) along 3-
Hence: Μ \= В •*• С iff there is some i such that for all 
α 
3, if 3i = öi and M0 (= B, then M. |= С 
Ρ Ρ 
Μ Η A means that M(A) is true, i.e. along each search-path 
α I find a proof of M(A) i.e. M (= A for all o, admitted 
The idea to allow in Kripke models that M t= f (s is a 
s 
finite sequence of natural numbers), under the condition 
"if M f= f, then M (= A for all formulas A", is due to W. 
Veldman [10] . 
Kripke models of this type are called generalized Kripke 
models. By this idea W. Veldman was able to give an 
intuitionistically correct completeness proof (with respect 
to generalized Kripke models), escaping the Gôdel-Kreisel 
argument of [19] (see section 4). 
W. Veldman's idea was applied by the author to Beth models 
in [ 11] , in which an intuitionistically correct completeness 
proof is given with respect to generalized Beth models. 
We have applied W. Veldman's idea again in the models, 
defined in this paper. 
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"If M |= f, then M |= A for all formulas A" says: if along 
the search-path α I discover that my presuppositions yield 
absurdity, then each sentence holds along the search path a. 
As remarked in the introduction, W. Veldman's idea seems to 
give an interpretation of negation, which is nearer to what 
Brouwer meant by negation. 
Notice the difference between Intuitionistic and Minimal 
logic. For intuitionistic logic the condition "if M |= f, 
then M H" A for all formulas A" should hold, but not for 
minimal logic. 
Difference between our models and Kripke- and Beth-models: 
Motivation for Kripke and Motivation for our models 
Beth models 
A model M assigns to each 
formula A one concrete 
sentence M(A) over IN and 
there is a partially ordered 
set of possible proof-situa­
tions s for M(A). 
A model M assigns to each 
formula A one concrete 
sentence M(A) over IN and 
there is a spread of 
possibilities a (presup­
positions) to search for 
a proof of M(A). 
Kripke: M (= A means that in 
the proofsituation s I have a 
proof of M(A). 
Beth: M \= A means that in the 
s 
M H A means that searching 
along the path α I find a 
proof of M(A), i.e. 
searching along α there is 
proof-situation s it holds that, some i such that at time i 
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no matter how I proceed 
with my research, I will 
find a proof of M(A). 
Kripke : M И A means that 
in all proof-situations 
s I have a proof of M(A). 
Beth: M ^ A means that for 
all s Μ μ= Α. 
's 
Remark A; Because of the motivation for Beth-models and 
for our models one can expect that a generalized Beth-model 
is formally equivalent with a model in our sense. Using 
Brouwer's Continuity Principle this turns out to be true 
(theorem 3.5). 
One might say that in the models, as defined in this 
paper, the motivation behind the Beth models appears more 
precisely and more explicitly than in the Beth models 
themselves. 
Notice the difference between M H= A for Kripke-models 
at the one hand and M ^ A for Beth- and for our models at 
the other hand. M ^- A in the sense of Kripke means that in 
all proofsituations s I have a proof of M(A), while M h= A 
in the sense of Beth or in our sense rather means that along 
each search-path α I will find a proof of M(A). 
Remark; In definition 1.1 we defined a dressed spread 
<S W ,T> by adjoining to each finite sequence, admitted by 
S
w
 , an element of another spread, namely an element of 
DO 
{0,1} . 
I have found a proof of M(A). 
M |= A means that along each 
search-path α I will find a 
proof of M(A). 
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However, it is not necessary to use in the definition of a 
model another spread, because in practice we are interested 
in the models for some formula A, in which only finitely 
many propositional variables occur. 
So we can replace definition 1.1 by the following one: 
A model M is a dressed spread <S ,T >, where S , 
M M M 
the spread-law, regulates the choices of natural numbers, 
while Τ , the complementary law, assigns to each finite M 
sequence, which is admissible according to the spread-law 
S , a finite subset of PS, such that if Q e Τ (<a„ ,...a >), M M 0 η 
then Q e Т
м
(<а0 ^ fa n + 1» . 
If α is an admissible infinitely proceeding sequence, 
then M : PS -»• σ„. is defined by M (Q) (к) = 1 = Q e Τ fäk) 
a 01 mon J a D M 
= 0 otherwise. 
Example 1.5 : Let M = <Sw ,T > be the following model: 
' M M 
Q P P Q Q Q Q P P P P P P P P 
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Then: not Μ Κ -(Ρ & Q) •+• - Ρ V - Q . 
Proof: Suppose M И -(Ρ * Q) -*--Ρ V - Q . 
Then for all a, if M \= - (P & Q), then M (= - Ρ ν - Q. 
Now for all α, M f= - (P & Q). Hence for all α, M f= - Ρ 
or M |= - Q. 
a 
But for 3 the left-most admissible infinitely proceeding 
sequence, not M =^ - Ρ and not M |= - Q. Contradiction. 
ρ Ρ 
q.e.d. 
Example 1.6: L e t M = <S ,T > b e t h e f o l l o w i n g m o d e l . 
P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
I/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ 
Then: n o t Μ μ. — Ρ -> P. 
Proof: Suppose M =^ — Ρ -»• P. 
Then for all a, if M И- —Ρ, then M f= P. 
a a 
Now, for all α, M t= - - P. Hence, for all α, M \= P. 
But for 0 the right-most admissible infinitely proceeding 
q.e.d. 
sequence, not M. |= P. 
ρ 
Contradiction. 
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§2. Models for the intuitionistic predicate calculus. 
Let τ: IN -»· IN be given, with τ(ο) = 0. 
Suppose the alphabet of our language has the following 
symbols: 
v. ,ν« , ... free variables 
X- ' X9 ' * *· 
1 9 ' * * * Τ 
f = P (falsity) 
о 
ν, &, -»• 
(Χ), (EX) 
bound variables 
predicate symbols 
connectives 
quantifiers 
We will use ν for arbitrary free variables ν. with i = 1,2, 
χ for arbitrary bound variables χ. with i = 1,2 ... eind Ρ 
and Q for arbitrary predicate symbols P. with i e IN. 
P. is ал m - ary predicate symbol = τ (i) = m. 
By definition f is o-ary. 
If A is a formula, we define -A = A -*• f. 
σ
η
 is the binary fan of all infinite sequences of zero's 
and one's. 
σ
ηι m ™ S * α e σηι'· ί") (α ln+1) > α(η))} · 01 mon D 01 
PN = the set of all expressions of the form 
f or < Q, n. ,..., η > 
where m is an arbitrary natural number, Q is an m-ary 
predicate symbol and η ,.,.η are natural numbers. 
1 m 
Notation: A(v. ,.,.,ν ) is a formula A, such that each free 1 m 
variable, occurring in A, is an element of {v. ,..., ν } . 
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A model M interpretes an m-ary predicate symbol Ρ as a 
* 
predicate Ρ over the natural numbers and gives at the same 
time for each m-tuple <n, ,..., η > of natural numbers a 
1 m 
possible development of our knowledge about the proposition 
* 
Ρ (η ,...,n ). 
ι m 
Definition 2.1: A model M is a dressed spread <S ,TW> , 
^
-
— — — — — ~ M M 
where S , the spread-law, regulates the choices of natural 
M 
numbers, while Τ , the complementary law, assigns to each 
M 
finite sequence, which is admissible according to the 
spread-law S , a mapping from PN to {0,1} , such that, if 
TM(<ao,...,ak>)« Q, nj nm>)= l,thenTM(<ao a^ 
Vl" )(<Q' ni V * = ^ 
If α is an infinitely proceeding sequence, admitted by S 
M 
then M : PN •> σ
Λ
, i s defined by Μ ( < 0 , n . , . . . . η >)(к) 
α 01 mon α ϊ ' m 
= Τ (ök)(<Q,n , . , . , η >) . D M 1 m 
Remark: It will turn out that we can restrict ourselves to 
models <S, T
w
>, where S is one fixed spread-law for all 
M 
Μ , for example the universal or the binary spread-law. 
Definition 2.2: Let M be a model <S„ ,T > and let α be an 
infinitely proceeding sequence, admitted by S . 
M 
M |= f = for some к e IN, M (f)(к) = 1. 
Let Α(ν. ,.,.,ν ) be a formula and let η,,...,η be l m l m 
natural numbers. 
M И Α(ν.,...,ν) [η ,.,.,ηJ = 
α i m i m D 
1. M и f or 
о 
2. A(ν ,.,.,ν ) = Ρ(ν,,.,.,ν ), m an arbitrary natural 
1 m 1 m 
number, Ρ an m-ary predicate symbol, and for some к e IN 
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M (<P,n , . , . , η >)(k) = 1 , or 
α ϊ m 
3 . A = В VC and (M *= B[n, , . . . , η ] o r M (= C [ n . , . , . , η ]) 
a l m a l m 
o r 
4 . A = В & С and (M M B[n, , . . . , n ] and M К C[n 4 , . . . , n 1) 
a l m a l m 
o r 
5. A = В -»• С and there is some к e IN, such that for all 
admissible infinitely proceeding sequences β with 
3k = ok, if M |= B[n. ,...,n ] , then M f= C[n ,...,n ], 
ρ 1 m ρ ι m 
or 
6. A(v.,....v ) = (Εχ)Β(χ,ν,,...,ν ) and there is some η e IN 
l m l m 
such that M \= Β(ν,ν ,...,ν )[η,η ,.,.,η ], or 
7. Α(ν. , ,ν ) = (χ)Β(χ,ν. ,.,.,ν ) and there is some 
l m l m 
к e IN, such t h a t for a l l admissible i n f i n i t e l y proceeding 
sequences 3 with 3k = öik and for a l l na tu r a l numbers η 
M 1= B(v,v , . . . , v ) [ n , n , . , . , η ] . 
ρ ' ι m l m 
Definition 2.3: Let M be a model <SW ,T >. 
— — — — ^ ^ M M 
M 1= A(v. ,.,.,ν )[ η. ,.,.,η 1 = for all infinitely 1 m l m D 
proceeding sequences a, 
admitted by S„ , M H= A(v. ,...,ν )[ η. ,...,n ]. 
Μ α 1 m l m 
Lemma 2.4: Let M be a model and α an infinitely proceeding 
sequence, admitted by S
w
 . 
M 
M Ë= Α(ν, ,...,ν )[ η. ,...,η ] iff there is some к e IN, 
α 1 m l m 
such that for all infinitely proceeding sequences 3, 
admitted by S
w
 , if 3k = ak, then M. (= A(v. , ,v ) 
Μ ρ 1 m 
[η ,... ,η ] . 
1 m 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
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Remark В: Notice, that we have defined validity by validity 
in admissible infinitely proceeding sequences a (M И A ) , 
while in Beth-, Grzegorczyk- and Kripke- models validity is 
defined by validity in the nodes s of some partially ordered 
set (M 1= A). 
s 
This causes, that from a technical point of view our 
definition of M t= A(v. ,...,v )[n, ,.,.,η ] is simpler 
1 m l m 
than the corresponding notions of Beth [2] and Kripke [6] : 
For Beth-models the satisfaction-relation is complicated 
in the case of atomic formulas, disjunction, implication and 
existential quantifier, but they have a fixed universe. 
In Kripke-models the universe is growing and the 
satisfaction-relation is complicated in the case of impli­
cation and universal quantifier. 
Now, in our new semantics, the universe is a fixed one, 
namely IN, and all cases in the definition of the 
satisfaction-relation are straightforward, except in the 
case of implication and universal quantifier. 
It should be noted here that each model M in our sense 
can be conceived as a topological model in the sense of 
[1] : 
Take for the underlying topological space the admissible 
infinitely proceeding sequences as points and the sets 
V = { a | a k = s for some к e IN } as neighbourhoods 
(s is an admitted finite sequence of natural numbers). 
The open set [ [ A ]], associated with the sentence A in the 
topological model is { a| M ^ A } . 
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Then [[В V C ] ] = { a J M | = B V C } 
= { о | м н = В о г М І = С } 
α α 
= { α Ι Μ
α
Ν Β} υ { α I M и С} 
= [[ в ]]и[[ с ]] 
So, the technical simplification, with respect to Beth-models, 
mentioned above in for example the interpretation of ν , 
was already known in classical metamathematics (see [1] ), 
because of the well-known equivalence of Beth-models and 
topological models (see [3] and [21] , section 4). 
Example 2.5: Let M = < S ,Τ > be the following model: 
* M M 
Pd) Q P(1)Q P(1)Q Pd) Q P(1)Q^,Q I 5L Q P(l) ,P(2) ,P(3) ,P(4) 
P(2)\ \, l ' 4 / F U , X
 ' P(3) X / 
Pd) 
Then: not M |= (x) (P(x) V Q) -> (x) (P(x)) V Q. 
Remark: Let β be the rightmost admissible, infinitely 
proceeding sequence. 
Then M.(Q)(k) = 0 for all к e IN. 
Ρ 
Mp(P(l)) = 1 1 1 1 . . . 
Μ
β
(Ρ(2)) = 0 1 1 1 . . . 
Μ
β
(Ρ(3)) = 0 0 1 1 . . . 
Μ
β
(Ρ(4)) = 0 0 0 1 ... 
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Proof: Suppose M |= (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν Q) -»• (χ) (Ρ (χ)) ν Q. 
Then for all ο, if Μ И (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν Q) , then Μ ^ 
<χ α 
(χ) (Ρ (χ)) V Q. 
Μ
β
 |= (χ)(Ρ(χ) V Q). Hence Μ
β
 μ (χ)(Ρ(χ)) or Μ |= Q. 
But not MQ μ (
χ)(Ρ(x)) and not Μ И Q. 
Ρ Ρ 
Contradiction. q.e.d. 
OD TM 
D e f i n i t i o n 2 . 6 : IN = { a e IN ; (En) (к) (к > η -+• а =а ) }. 
Let M = <SW »Τ > be a model, A = A(v. , . , . , ν . ) a M M 1. 1 1 m 
CD 
formula, w i t h m f r e e v a r i a b l e s , and a e IN . 
M
a
 И A [ a ]
 D " a 1 " A ( v i '•••'vi ) [ а і ' · • · » ! 1 · 
1 m i m 
M И = А = M t = A [ a ] for a l i a e l № \ 
α D a 
M ^ A = M N= A for a l l i n f i n i t e l y proceeding sequences 
α , admitted by S „ . M 
Theorem 2.7: The models M = <S,T > , where S is one fixed 
— — — — — — M 
spread-law for all M, form a fan W. 
Proof: Let d
n
/d ,d ,... be an enumeration of PN and let 
sequences, such that if s. is an initial segment of s., 
then i < j . 
We can represent a model M = <S,T > by the following 
M scheme: 
d0 äl d2 d3 
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where the following local conditions should be satisfied: 
is s. is an initial segment of s , then Τ„(s.)(к) < 
ι j M 1 
Τ (s.)(к) for all к e IN. 
M з 
So we can code a model M = < S, Τ > as an infinite sequence 
M 
u of natural numbers with μ(<3. ,d.>) = T„(s.)(d.). 
κ
 ι 3 Μ ι j 
Now it is easy to see that the theorem holds. q.e.d. 
Definition 2.8: Let A be a formula and Γ a (possibly 
infinite) set of formulas. 
1= A = M И A for all M e W . D 
Г И A = for all M e w , for all a e IN and for all 
admissible infinitely proceeding sequences a, if 
M N= С [a] for all С e Г, then M И A [ a] . 
α α 
Example 2.9: Let M = <SW ,Τ > be the following model: 
— * M M 
P(l) P(2) P(l) P(2) P(l) P(2) Р Ш P(2) P(l) P(2) P d ^ P U ) P(l) P(2) Ρ 
P(3)
v
P(4) P(3), P(3)\ / P(3)' 
P(l) 
P(l) 
Then: M ^ - (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν-ρ(χ)), 
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Proof: It is sufficient to show, that for each a, not 
M
a
 H (x) (P(x) ν -P(x)). 
So, suppose a is an admissible infinitely proceeding sequence 
and M И(x)(P(x) V - P(x)). Then there is some к e IN, such 
that for all 3 and for all η e IN, if fîk = ak, then 
Mg |= Ρ (ν) [ η] or Μ
β
 (= - Ρ (ν) [ η] . 
Now, let γ be the rightmost admissible infinitely proceeding 
sequence through ok. 
Then for all η > k+1, not Μ (= Ρ(ν) [η]. 
Hence M \=- Ρ (ν) [η] for all η > k+1. 
So for all η > k+1 there is some 1 e IN, such that for all 
η 
δ, i f ¿il = γΐ then not M, И Ρ (ν) [ η] . 
η η ο 
But for the le f t-most δ through γ ΐ . . 9 we do have t h a t 
M 6 N P ( v ) [ k + 2 ] . 
Contradiction. q.e.d. 
Remark: The same model makes clear, that (x)(- -P(x))-> - -
(x)(P(x)) is not valid. 
Definition 2.10: Let M = <S
w
 ,T„> be a model. 
• M M 
M explodes = for some infinitely proceeding sequence a, 
admitted by S„ , M h= f. 
Μ α ' 
M is trivial = M |= f, i.e. M H f for all α. D α 
Definition 2.11: Let Γ be a set of formulas. 
Γ is decidable = we have a method, such that for each 
formula A we can decide in finitely many steps whether 
A e Γ or not A e Г. 
Later on, for the proof of the completeness of IPC with 
respect to the notion of validity of definition 2.8, we need 
the following 
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Definition 2.12: Let M be a model <S„ ,T > and let α be an 
admissible infinitely proceeding sequence. 
00 
Let A be a formula and a e IN . 
M
a
 К A [a] -
1. M explodes or 
2. A = Ρ(v. ,...,v ), m an arbitrary natural number, Ρ an 
m-ary predicate symbol, and for some k e IN, 
M (<P,a. ,...fa >)(k) = 1, or a i m , , 
3. A = В V C and (M N= В [ a] or M И С [ a] ) , or 
α α 
4. A = В & С 
as in definition 2.2 
with " Η " instead of 
1= II . II 
7. A = (x)B(x, v. ,..., ν ) 1 m 
H A = for all M e w , for all α and for all a e IN™, 
M И A [ a] . 
α 
Let Γ be a set of formulas. 
Γ f= A = for all M e w , for all α and for all a e IN™, 
if M И С [a] for all С e Г, then M ù A [ a] . 
Lemma 2.13: M =^ A [a] iff there is some k e IN, such that 
α 
for all g, if ßk = ok, then M. И A [ a] . 
ρ 
Proof: By induction on the complexity of A. 
q.e.d. 
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S3. Soundness, completeness and compactness. 
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness): Let A be a formula and Γ a set of 
formulas. 
i) If ^
с
 A, then N A. 
ii) If Г b- A, then Г f= A. 
Proof: by induction on the length of a derivation of A 
We will sketch now two intuitionistic completeness-
proofs. The first one is an adaptation of W. Veldman's 
completeness proof for generalized Kripke-models in [ 10] . 
The second one is an adaptation of the author's completeness 
proof for generalized Beth-models in [ 11] . After a sketch 
in this chapter, this second proof will be given in full 
detail in chapter II. 
Theorem 3.2 (Completeness): Let A be a formula and Г a 
decidable (possibly infinite) set of formulas (see 
definition 2.11) 
i) There is a model M = <S ,T > , where S determines a 
M M M 
spread, which is not a fan, such that 
if M И A(v. ,...,v ) [i ,...,i ], then 
Χ 1 Lm 1 
^ГРС
 А (
 І 1
 vi >· 
1 m 
Hence, if \= A, then f— A. 
ii) There is a model M = < S„ ,T > , where S
w
 determines a 
M M M 
spread, which is not a fan, such that 
M И С(v. ,...,ν. )[ i ,...,i ] for all 
ι, i l m 1 m 
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C(v. , ... ,ν. ) e Γ and such that if M ^- A(v ,... ,v ) 
1 m l m 
[i1 ,...,im] , then Г ^ A. 
Hence, if rf=A, then Γ (— A. 
Remark C: In [10] W. Veldman constructed a spread such that 
to each α there was associated a semi-regular set Γ of 
α 
sentences. 
So, what he actually constructed, was precisely a model in 
our sense. 
In order to make a Kripke-model from this, he had to 
take the elements of the spread as the nodes of a set, which 
is partially ordered b y a < β = Γ G Г. Because this 
D QC — ρ 
ordering is non-discrete, this was a rather strange Kripke-
model. 
It is nice to see, that with our notion of a model, 
the proof of [10] , after adaptation, becomes more natural: 
our models are dressed spreads and not trees with a partial 
ordering. 
Instead of Γ t= A we will sometimes simply write: Γ |— A. 
Sketch of a proof: i) Let M = <SW ,T > be the following model: *• M M 
S. is the spread-law Σ, defined in [10], 3.32 and Τ (ak) 
M M 
(<P, η. ,...,η >) = 1 = Ρ(ν ,...,ν ) e Γ(ok), where Γ is 1 m D n . η 1 m 
defined as in [ 10] , 3 . 3 2 . 
As i n [ 10], i t i s now suf f ic ient t o show t h a t for a l l a, 
admitted by S and for a l l formulas A(v. , . . . , v . ) 
M i . i 1 m 
M |=A(v. , . . . , v . )[ i , , . . . , i ] i f f A (v. , . . . , v . )e Γ 
α ι . i l m ι, ι α l m l m 
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A = P(v ,...,v ) : M |= P(v ,.,.,ν. )[i ,...,iJ 
ι, ί α ι. ι ι ш 1 m _ l m 
0
 for some к, Τ (ok)(<P,i, ,.,.,ί >) = 1 
м i m 
<*• for some к, Ρ (v. ,.,.,ν. )e Г(ак) 
1 m 
*> P(v. ,. ..,v. ) e Г . 
ι. ι α 1 m 
A = В ->• С, from right to left: Suppose В -»• С e Г . 
α 
Then for some k, Β -ν С e Г (ok) . 
We want to show that if ßk = ok and M N=B, then M И С. 
_ _ p p 
So suppose ßk = ok and M f=^  В. By induction hypothesis 
ρ _ _ 
В e Г. . Because В ->• С e Г(ак) and fik = йк, В ->• С e Γ
α
. Hence 
Ρ Ρ 
Γ0 |— С So С e Г and by induction hypothesis M 1= С. P P ρ 
А = В -> С, from left to right: Suppose M (= В ->- с, 
α 
i.e. there is some к such that for all β, 
if Bk = ök and Μ |= В, then M t= С. 
Ρ Ρ 
By induction hypothesis: there is some k, such that for 
all β, if ßk = ök and В e Г0, then С e Г . 
В β 
Let F be the subfan, defined in 4.1 of [ 10] , restricted to 
those β, for which ßk = ak. 
Then С e Гд for all β e F, i.e. for all β e F there is an 
m e IN such that С e r(ßm). 
By the fan-theorem there is some m e IN, such that for all 
β e F, С e Γ(βιη) . 
Like in 4.1 of [ 10] , we can conclude that Γ , В |— С. 
So Г I— В -> С and hence В ->- С e Г . 
α а 
The other cases are similar, see [ 10 ] . 
The proof of ii) is an easy generalization of the proof of i) 
q.e.d. 
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As a consequence of theorem 3.2 we get a compactness 
theorem for non-trivial models (see definition 2.10): 
Corollary 3.3 (Compactness): Let Γ be a decidable (possibly-
infinite) set of sentences. 
If each finite subset of Γ has a non-trivial model, then 
Γ has a non-trivial model. 
Proof: Suppose each finite subset of Γ has a non-trivial 
model. Then not Γ |— f. 
Let M = <S
w
 ,T > be the model of theorem 3.2 ii). Then for 
M M 
all С e Г , M f= С, and if M \=- f, then Г |— f. Hence not 
M t= f, i.e. M is non-trivial. 
q.e.d. 
Corollary 3.4: Let Г be a set of formulas. 
If for all models M e w (W is the fan of all models, see 
theorem 2.7) there is a formula A e Г , such that M |= A 
(M |= - A), then there is some formula A e Γ such that 
M (= Α (Μ μ. - A) for all models M e W. 
Proof: Suppose for all models M e W there is a formula 
A e Γ , such that M =^- A. 
Then also for the model M of theorem 3.2 i) there is some 
formula В e Γ such that M f= В. 
But then, by theorem 3.2 i) |— B, and hence, by theorem 
3.1, |=B. , 
1
 q.e.d. 
In theorem 3.5 below, we will show that we can 
re-interprete each Beth-model as a model in the sense of 
definition 2.1 and 2.2. and conversely that we can re­
interprete each model in the sense of these definitions 
as a Beth-model. 
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One might say that a model in the sense of our 
definitions is just an intuìtionistic interpretation of a 
Beth-model and that a Beth-model is just a classical 
interpretation of a model in our sense. 
We will show below that the notions of Beth-validity, 
denoted by ^ , and of intuitionistic validity in our 
sense, formally coincide. 
The formal equivalence of our models with Beth-models 
is not simply true by definition, but the proof uses 
Brouwer's Continuity Principle. For Beth models we take the 
notation of [ll] and for simplicity we will restrict 
ourselves to non-exploding models. 
Theorem 3.5 (Formal equivalence of a non-exploding Beth-
model and of a non-exploding model in our sense) : 
i) Let M = <S ,T > be a model (in our sense). 
M M 
Define the Beth-model M' as follows: for s an 
admissible finite sequence 
M'(s) = {<P,n . , . . . , η > ; Τ ( s ) ( < P , n . , . , . , η >) = 1} . D g ι m м ι m 
Then M' H= Ata] i f f for a l l a d m i s s i b l e α through s , 
M | = A [ a ] . 
α
 в 
Hence, i f Γ Η=· A, then Γ Η Α. 
i i ) Let M' be a Beth-model. 
Def ine M = <S ,T > a s f o l l o w s : for s an a d m i s s i b l e 
M M 
f i n i t e sequence 
T M ( s ) ( < P , n 1 , . , . , η > ) = 1 = <P,n , . . . , n > e M ' ( s ) . 
м ι m D l m 
Then M ' fc= A [ a] iff for all a through s , M fc= A [ a] . 
Hence, if Γ |= A, then Γ |= д. 
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Proof: 
A = P(v ,.,.,ν ) : M' |= P(v ,..., )[а ,...,a] 
1 m s i m l m 
** for all α through s there is some к e IN such that 
<&,a.. ,. ..,a > e M' (ok) 1 m 
0
 for a l l α through s there i s some к e IN such t h a t 
TM(äk)(<P,a , . . . , a >) = 1 M l m 
0
 for all α through s , M fc= P(v. ,...,v ) [ a. ,...,a ] . 
a l m l m 
A = B v C : M , fc= B V C 
's 
о for all α through s there is some к e IN such that 
M' |= В or M' |= с 
ak ak 
о for all о through s there is some к e IN such that 
for all 3 through ok , Μ =^. В or for all 0 through 
_ ρ 
ok, Mp \= С 
( *) о for all a through s,M l=BorM t=C 
α ~ α 
о for all о through s , M t= Β ν С. 
α 
То prove (*) from below to above we use the continuity-
principle of Brouwer (see [13] ). 
A = В & С : immediate from the induction hypothesis. 
A = B-+-C: M' Д B + C 
о for all s' , such that s is an initial part of s1 , 
if Μ' β, В, then M' |= С 1
 s' s' 
о for all s' , such that s is an initial part of s' , 
if for all α through s', Μ ^ В, then for all α through 
s', M ь= с 
О -
(*) «• for all α through s , if M 1= В, then M 1= С 
α ^ α
 г
^ 
о for all о through s , M ь=. в -»- С. 
α
 г
^ 
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proof of (*) from above to below: suppose α goes through 
s and Μ |= В; then there is some к > length of s , such 
that for all β through ok, M |= B; hence for all 3 
_ P 
through ok , M =^ C; so M t= C. 
P OL 
1
 immediate from the induction hypothesis. (Ex)B(x)  
(x)B(x) / 
q.e.d. 
Having shown the formal equivalence of(non-exploding) 
Beth-models and of our (non-exploding) models, we can use 
the results of [ 11] , in which an intuitionistic complete­
ness proof is given with respect to generalized Beth-models, 
in order to establish another completeness proof. 
The advantage of this completeness proof is, that, in 
practice, it gives you a countermodel for those formulas, 
which are not valid. 
But in [11] our satisfaction-relation was defined in 
such a way, that if M explodes (somewhere) (see definition 
2.10), then all formulas A are valid in M. 
So, in order to be able to adapt the completeness 
proof of [ 11] , we need the following theorem: 
Theorem 3.6: i) If μ= A (definition 2.8), then И A 
(definition 2.12) 
ii) If Г |= A (definition 2.8), then Г И A 
(definition 2.12) 
Proof: Let N = < S
u
 ,T > be a model. 
Ν N 
Define M = < S ,Τ > as follows: 
M M 
s = s 
M N 
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Let s ,s_ ,S- , . . . be an enumeration of the admissible 
f i n i t e sequences. 
For Ρ JÉ f l e t Τ (s ) (<P, η , . , . , η >) = M l ι m D 
т
кт(3^)(<р'пі /···» n >) a n d T„ (s. )(f) = 1 = for some 
N i l m M l D 
j < i, T N (s )(f) = 1. 
In words: as soon as we notice f somewhere in N, then we put 
f in each admissible sequence in M. Now, by induction on 
the complexity of A one easily shows: 
M H A [a] iff N И A [a] 
ο α 
Hence, if =^ A, then H= A, and, if Г И A» then Г |= A. 
q.e.d. 
In theorem 3.2 one model M is given such that validity in M 
implies derivability in IPC. 
Hence, if И A, then f—- A. 
IPC 
Theorem 3.5, theorem 3.6 and the completeness proof of 
[ 11] suggest another proof of the completeness of IPC with 
respect to the semantics of this paper: validity in all 
models of a certain type implies derivability in IPC. 
Theorem 3.7 (Completeness): Let A be a formula and let 
Г be a decidable set of formulas. 
i) if |= A, then ^ A. 
ii) if Г И A, then Г ^
c
 A. 
Sketch of a proof: Suppose Г \=- A. Then, by theorem 3.6, 
Г (==· A. Because of theorem 3.5 one can adapt the 
completeness proof of [11] to a proof of Г h— Α. 
q.e.d. 
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The proof of theorem 3.7, which we have sketched here, 
will be given in full detail in chapter II. 
We already mentioned that the advantage of the complete­
ness proof of [11] is, that, in practice, it yields a 
counter-model for those formulas, which are not valid. 
For the propositional calculus this completeness proof even 
gives a finite decisionprocedure: If A is a formula of the 
intuitionistic propositional calculus, then either A is 
derivable, or there is a counter-model for A. 
As a consequence of theorem 3.2 we had in corollary 3.3 a 
compactness theorem for non-trivial models. The completeness 
proof of theorem 3.7 yields a weak compactness result. 
Corollary 3.8 (Weak Compactness) : Let Γ be a decidable set 
of sentences. If each finite subset of Γ has a non-exploding 
model, then not for all M e W, if M is a model of Γ , then M 
explodes. 
Sketch of a proof: Suppose each finite subset of Γ has a 
non-exploding model. Then not Γ l·— f. Now, suppose for all 
M e W, if M is a model of Γ , then M explodes. Then all 
models, obtained by application of the systematic procedure, 
which is described in [11] and in definition 2.2 of chapter 
II of this paper, to Τ Γ , F f , explode. 
But then Γ I— f. Contradiction. 
q.e.d. 
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§4 Completeness, Markov's principle and Church's Thesis. 
To allow the false formula "f" to be satisfied in a 
model M enlarges the class of all models and has important 
consequences concerning negation, as is also pointed out in 
W. Veldman [ 10] , section 5. 
For a formula A, - A is defined by A -*• f, and hence 
M (= - A means something like "if M =^ A, then M |=. f " , 
which is different from "not Μ μ= A" or "if M (= A, then 
contradiction", as it is usually defined. 
This causes that the Gödel-Kreisel-argument [ 19] , that 
completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus implies 
Markov's principle, cannot be applied for our notion of 
validity. More precisely: the proof of corollary 4.5 in 
D. van Dalen, "Lectures on Intuitionism" in the proceedings 
of the Cambridge Summer School in Mathematical Logic, 1971, 
[15] , does not hold for our notion of a model. 
Because corollary 4.5 of [ 15] is used to show that the 
intuitionistic predicate calculus is incomplete, if Church's 
Thesis is assumed (page 86), also the proof of this result 
does not hold for our notion of validity. 
All arguments fail by the essential difference in the 
treatment of negation. 
Confer also A. Troelstra, [16], В 15. 
In this context it may be worth-while to mention that in 
[20] , page 145, G. Kreisel proves that Church's Thesis is 
inconsistent with the Brouwer-Kripke-scheme, attributing 
the result to S. Kripke. 
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Related results, which were pointed out by W. Gielen 
(Nijmegen) [ 9] are the following: 
a) The Brouwer-Kripke-scheme 
BKS (Εα) (A** (En) (a (η) = 1 ) ) 
01 mon 
as a scheme for with finite information completely 
IN described A, yields a function α e {0,1} , which is not 
recursive. 
Proof: BKS yields a function 
α e σ
η
. with - (EzjT,(Ο,Ο,ζ) «* (En)(α (η) = 1) 
ο Olmon 1 ο 
α
ΐ
 e a01mon W i t h " (^"V1'1^) «* (ΕηΗα^η) = 1) 
and so on. 
Hence we can construct step by step a function α e{0,1} 
by taking a(<p,q>) = a (q). The supposition that α is 
Ρ 
recursive yields a contradiction, because - (Ez) Τ (ρ,ρ,ζ) 
is not recursively enumerable. 
b) Church's Thesis (CT) 
(ρ) (Eq)B(p,q) ->• (Ее) [ (r) (Es) ^  (e,r, s) & (p)B (p, {e} (p) )] 
В without other free variables than ρ and q, can be refuted 
with BKS, if we accept the functions, which are indicated 
by the following notation: о is the choice-sequence, we 
get via BKS applied to A. 
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Proof: Apply Church's Thesis to B(p, q) = 
q = a
- (Ez) Tj ((p)o . (p)o , z) ^ l * · 
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II A N I N T U I T I O N I S T I C P R O O F 
O F T H E C O M P L E T E N E S S 
T H E O R E M 
In chapter I, section 3, we have sketched two 
different proofs of the completeness theorem for intu-
itionistic predicate calculus with respect to the models, 
defined in chapter I, definition 2.1 and 2.2. 
That such a proof can be given in intuitionistic 
metamathematics is due to the fact, that following an idea 
of W. Veldman [ 10 ], I consider the fan of all models, 
exploding or non-exploding. 
In [ 10 ], W. Veldman gave a Henkin-type completeness 
proof for Kripke models. In chapter I, theorem 3.2 it is 
indicated how one can adapt this proof to a completeness 
proof with respect to our semantics, as described in chapter 
I. 
In chapter I, theorem 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, we also 
sketched a Gödel-type completeness proof, which was an 
adaptation of the author's completeness proof for Beth-models 
( [U ]). 
In this chapter II we will give this Gödel-type 
completeness proof in full detail. 
For technical details I am indebted to M. Fitting's 
book [ 18 ] . 
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§1 Proof Theory 
The proof-system, which is described below, is a 
reformulation of M. Fitting's system in [18 ]. 
Let τ : IN -»• IN be given, with τ(ο) = 0. 
Suppose the alphabet of our language has the following 
symbols: 
Logical symbols: ν ,v_ ,... free variables 
x. ,x„ ,... bound variables 
ν , S , •*• connectives 
(χ) , (Ex) quantifiers 
Predicate symbols: P. ,P9 ,... 
f = Ρ (falsity) 
We will use ν for arbitrary free variables v. with i = 1,2,. 
χ for arbitrary bound variables x. with i = 1 , 2 , ... and 
Ρ and Q for arbitrary predicate symbols P. with i e IN. 
P. is an m-ary predicate symbol = т(і) = m. 
By definition f is o-ary. 
Formulas are defined in the usual way. 
If A is a formula, we define - A = A •*• f. 
We use different symbols for free and bound variables 
to simplify the quantifier rules. 
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Notation: Β(ν.,...,ν ) is a formula B, such that each free 
variable, occurring in B, is an element of 
{v. ,.,.,ν } . 1 η 
Definition 1.1; A signed formula is an expression of the 
form Τ(A) or F(A), where A is a formula. 
If it is clear from the context what is meant, we will 
simply write TA instead of Τ(A) and FA instead of F(A). For 
example, instead of T(B & C) we will mostly write TB&C. 
M. Fitting [ 18] attaches intended meanings to TA and 
FA, namely: 
TA : I have a proof of A, and 
FA : I do not have a proof of A. 
And he explains the notion of derivability in terms of 
finding a counterexample: a formula A is derivable in 
intuition!stic predicate calculus if all ways, which may 
give a counterexample, close. 
I prefer a different treatment: In this paper TA and 
FA do not have an intended meaning, but are only notational 
conveniences, used for historical reasons. However, we do 
attach an intended meaning to a finite set of signed 
formulas: 
Definition 1.2: S is a sequent = S is a finite set of 
signed formulas. 
Notation: If S is a sequent, S is the set of all TA with 
TA e S. 
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Intended interpretation of {TA ,...,ΤΑ , FB ,..., FB }: 
A, & ... & А -»-В, V. . . V В 1 n i m 
The rules below are to be read: if the situation (s) 
above the line is (are) the case, the situation below the 
line is also the case. 
Axioms: sequents S such that for some formula A 
TA, FA e S or Tf e S. 
Rules: 
S, TA&B, ТА, ТВ 
S, TA&B 
S, TAVB, TA S, TAVB, ТВ 
S, TAVB 
S, TA ->B, FA S, TA->B, ТВ 
"*" S, TA-+B 
TE S, T(Ex)A(x) , TA(v) 
S, T(Ex)A(x) *" S, F(Ex)A(x) 
ν not occurring in S 
т ( , S,T(,)Mx) Μ(ν) F ( , ^_( )_ 
S,FA 
FV 
F -+• 
FF. ä 
s, 
s, 
s, 
S T 
s, 
S, 
FA&B 
FA, FB 
FAvB 
, TA, FB 
FA->B 
, FA(v) 
rFB 
S, T(x)A(x) S , F(x)A(x) 
ν not occurring in S 
A proof-tree or derivation starts from axioms and proceeds 
downwards by means of finitely many applications of the 
rules. The bottom sequent is said to be the conclusion of 
the proof tree. 
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Definition 1.3: Let A be a formula and Γ a possibly infinite 
set of formulas. 
A is derivable in IPC = there is a proof-tree with {FA} as 
conclusion. 
Notation: |— A. 
A is derivable from Γ in IPC = there are formulas 
B. ,...,B from Γ such that there is a proof-tree with 1 η 
{ТВ. ,,.,,ΤΒ , FA} as conclusion. 1 η 
Notation: Γ |— A. 
Example 1.4: \— (x)(P(x)) V Q -> (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν Q) 
Proof: 
T(x) (P(x))V Q,T(x)P(x),TP(v1),FP(v1),FQ T(x) (P (x) ) V Q^Q.FPiv^ ,FQ 
T(x) (P(x))V Q,T(x)P(x),TP(v.),FP(v.)V Q _, . ,_, ..
 л
 „^ „_ , .
 n 
1 1 T(x)(P(x)) ν Q,TQ,FP(vJ ν Q 
T(x) (P(x))V Q,T(x)P(x) »FPÇv^V Q 
T(x) (P(x))V Q,T(x)P(x),F(x) (P(x)V Q) T(x) (P (x) ) V Q,TQ,F(x) (Ρ (χ) ν Q) 
T(x)(P(x))V Q, F(x)(P(x)V Q) 
F(x)(P(x))VQ -> (x) (P(x)V Q) 
Notation: We use | to denote an application of rule 
F ->• or F ( ). 
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Properties of I— : 
1. Replacing in rule F -»• and F( ), S by S, we get a 
proof-system for classical predicate calculus (CPC) and 
the notion of Frz- A. 
Evidently, if |— A, then Ь^ A. 
S, FAiv^ , FA(v2) 
2. Notice, that
 5 > ρ ( Ε χ ) Α ( χ ) is a derived 
rule, because S U {F(Ex)A(x)} = 
S U {F(EX)A(X), F(EX)A(X)} . 
3. For A a formula of the propositional calculus and for Г 
a finite set of formulas of the propositional calculus 
Г |—A is decidable. The decision procedure is afforded 
by the process of attempting to construct a derivation 
of A from Г in IPC. 
4. In all F-rules, except in rule F -*• , going from bottom to 
top, only F-formulas are introduced, while in rule F ->· 
S is replaced by S . 
So: if {FA. ,..., FA } is the conclusion of a proof-tree, 1 m 
then it is impossible that in the axioms S, TB, FB of the 
proof-tree, ТВ results from FA. for some i and FB results 
from FA. for some j, j ^  i, by application of the rules. 
This observation gives the following results, which are 
already known from the literature (see for example [24 ] and 
[18] , chapter 6, lemma 4.2 and 4.3): 
i) Disjunction Property: If |— Β ν С, then |—В or |—C. 
ii) Explicit Definability Theorem: 
If I— (Ex) A(x, v, ,..., ν ) , then 1 m 
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I— Α (ν, , ν, ,..., ν ), where ν, is one of the v., 
к 1 m к 1 
1 < i < m , or ν is a free variable, which does not occur 
in (Ex) A(x , v, ,..., ν ). 1 m 
Also the following theorem is known from the literature 
(see [22] ), but I want to prove it here again explicitly 
in intuitionistic metamathematics. 
Theorem 1.5; For A a prenex formula, |—A is decidable. 
Proof: Ζ ((Ex)Β(χ, v. , . . . , v )) = 
i m u 
{в(ν , ν , . , . , ν ) , Β(ν ,ν , . . . , ν ) , . . . , Β (ν , ν . , . . . ν ) } 
κ ι m i l m m i m 
where ν is the first free variable, not occurring in (Ex) 
B(x, ν ,. . ., ν ). 1 m 
Z((x)B(x , v. ,..., ν )) = {B(v , ν ,..., ν )} , where 
ι m υ κ 1 m 
ν is again the first free variable, not occurring in (x) 
B(x , v. ,..., ν ). Clearly, 1— (χ) B(x , ν, ,.,.,ν ) iff 
1 m l m 
I—Β (ν , ν ,..., ν ) (*) . 
κ 1 m 
If R is a set of formulas of the form (Ex)B(x , v. ,...,v ) 
1 m 
or (x)B(x, ν, ,.,.,ν ), then Z(R) = U {Z(B); В e R }. l m D 
Clearly, if R is finite, then Z(R) is finite and the number 
of elements of Z(R) can easily be estimated from the 
definitions above. 
Suppose now that A is a prenex formula Q χ ... Q x B. 
Let R = Ζ(A) and by induction R = Ζ(R .) , k = 2,..., n. 
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It follows from 4 ii) (Explicit definability theorem) and 
(*) that A is derivable in IPC iff R. contains at least one 
derivable formula. 
By an easy induction with respect to к, к = 2 ,..., η we find 
that A is derivable iff R. contains at least one derivable 
formula . 
Consequently, A is derivable iff R contains at least one 
derivable formula. However, all formulas in R are 
η 
quantifier-free. 
And, if С is a quantifier-free formula, " |— C" is 
decidable: the decision procedure is afforded by the process 
of attempting to construct a derivation of C. 
So, because R is finite, we can decide by a finite method, 
whether there is a derivable formula in R . 
η 
q.e.d. 
Let A be a formula and let Γ be a set of formulas. In the 
next remark we use the expressions " Γ |— A is decidable" 
and " Γ is decidable" in the following sense: 
Γ |— A is decidable = We can decide in finitely many 
steps whether Γ |— A holds or does not hold. 
Γ is decidable = We have a finite method, such that we 
can decide for each formula В whether В belongs to Г 
or does not belong to Г . 
Remark: For A a formula of the propositional calculus and 
for Г an infinite set of formulas of the proposi­
tional calculus, Г |— A is not decidable, even 
when Г is decidable. 
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i +2 i +2 i +2 
Weak counterexample: F(i) = i + i = i 
F = (Ei) (i era & F (i)). 
Let Ρ and Q be propositional variables. 
Γ g {C1 ,C2 ,C3 ,...} where 
С. = Ρ ->(... -vP) if not F (i) 
i times 
and C. = (P ->(... ->· P) ) -> Q if for some j < i, F(j) . 
(i-1) times 
Then: if Γ is finite, then - F & F. 
So Γ is not finite and it is also easy to see that Γ is 
decidable. 
Now: Γ |— Q iff for some i, F(i). 
So, a decision about Γ |— Q would be a decision about the 
existence of some natural number i such that F(i). 
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§2. Systematic Procedure for Searching Derivations. 
Let Δ be a set of signed formulas and let Ρ be a set 
of free individual variables. 
Definition 2.1; Δ is a Hintikka element with respect to Ρ = 
1. If TB&C e Δ, then ТВ e Δ and TC e Δ . 
2. If TBVC e Δ, then ТВ e Δ or TC e Δ . 
3. If TB-)C e Δ, then FB с Δ or TC e Δ . 
4. If FB&C e Δ, then FB e Δ or FC e Δ . 
5. If FBVC e Δ, then FB e Δ and FC e Δ . 
5. If Τ (χ) Β (χ) e Δ , then for all ve Ρ, ТВ (ν) e Δ. 
7. If F(Ex)В(χ) с Δ, then for all ν e Ρ, FB(v) e Δ. 
It is easy to see, that if Δ' is a set of signed formulas 
and Ρ is a set of free variables, then we can extend Δ' to 
a Hintikka element Δ with respect to P. 
Remark: The expression "Δ is a Hintikka element with respect 
to P" is due to M. Fitting ( [ 1θ] , page 57 and 32). 
Notation: If Δ is a set of signed formulas, FVar (Δ) is the 
set of all free variables, occurring in Δ. 
Let us say we apply an inverted rule to a set S of signed 
formulas, if we replace S by one of the possible premisses, 
S ' S" S', S'' according to a rule of the system, i.e. ~ 
would be an application of one of the rules. 
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By a split formula we mean a formula of the form FB ->• С 
or F(x)B(x). 
The expression "split-formula" is due to A.S. Troelstra 
[16] and can be explained as follows: 
Suppose we would systematically search for derivations of 
a sequent S, by applying inverted rules to see whether we 
end up with a set of axioms. 
Now, an application of e.g. F -ν may destroy possibilities; 
e.g. if we consider 
S, FA -> B, FC -»• D 
there are two possibilities for applying F -> inversely, 
yielding 
S , TA , FB and S , TC , FD 
respectively; but in the first case we have lost the 
possibility of treating FC -+ D, in the second case of 
treating FA •+• B. We have to pursue the possibilities of 
finding a proof tree for S , TA , FB and S , TC , FD ; it 
is sufficient to find a proof tree in one of these cases. 
Let A be a formula. 
Definition 2.2; The systematic procedure for searching 
a derivation of A in IPC is the procedure, given by the 
following description: 
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Step 0: Consider{ FA } . 
Apply all inverted rules, except the rules F -»• , F( ), TE, 
as many times as possible, with the restriction, that we 
apply the inverted rule T( ) and FE only with respect to the 
free variables occurring in {FA} . 
Having finished step 0 of our procedure, we have one 
(if Τ V, Fi, and Τ -> have not been applied) or more 
Hintikka elements r with respect to F Var (Γ ) 
о о 
Each i is finite. 
о 
If Г contains ТВ and FB for some formula B, then we add 
о 
Tf to Г1 . 
о 
Motivation for step 1 ; Each Г may contain several split 
formulas, so for each Г there may be several ways to 
go on. Each way may result in an axiom, so for each Г 
we have to consider all possibilities to go on (step 1 a). 
In addition we can apply the inverted rules T( ), FE 
also with respect to free variables not occurring in Г 
(step 1 b). 
Observe also, that in step 0 we did not apply the 
inverted rule ТЕ. 
Step 1 a; For each split formula in Г , say the m , 
we form one or more successors Г ' of Г as 
o, m о 
follows: 
i) Let the m split formula in Г be of the form FB -*• С 
о 
Consider (Г ) , ТВ , FC and assume (Γ ) , TB, FC 
contains к formulas of the form T(Ex)D(x), say 
TtExJD^x) ,..., T(Ex)Dk(x). 
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Suppose b ,..., b are the first к free variables, 
which do not occur in (Г)„ , ТВ , FC. 
ο Τ 
Form Δ = ( φ
τ
 , ТВ , FC , TD^b^ ,..., ™
κ
( \ ) . 
Apply all inverted rules, except F -*• , F( ), and TE 
as many times as possible to Δ , with the restriction 
that we apply T( ) and FE only with respect to FVar (Δ) 
U { Ь ^ . 
Having finished step la i) we have one (if Τ ν , 
Fa and Τ -ν have not been applied) or more Hintikka-
elements Γ ' with respect to FVar (Γ ' ) . 
. о , m о , m 
Each Γ1 ' 2 is finite. 
о , m 
If Γ ' contains ТВ and FB for some formula B, then 
o, m 
we add Tf to Г 1' ^  . 
o, m 
ii) Let the m split formula in Г be of the form 
о 
F (χ) Β (χ). 
Consider (Γ ) , FB(b), where b is the first free 
variable not occurring in (Γ ) 
ο Τ 
Now proceed like in i). 
If Γ contains 1 split formulas, i) and ii) yield 
successors Γ ' , ,.,.,Γ ' , of Γ 
о, 1 о, 1 о 
The other successors Г ' , . , Γ ' , „ ,... are the same 
о, 1+1 о, 1+2 
and are yielded by step 1 b: 
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Step 1 b; Suppose ι contains к formulas of the form 
T(Ex)D(x), say T(Ex)D (x) , . .. , T(Ex)D (x). 
Suppose b ,..., b are the first free variables, not 
occurring in Г . 
Form Δ= Г^  , T D (b ) ,..., TD (b ). 
Apply all inverted rules, except F -> , F( ), and TE, as 
many times as possible to Δ , with the restriction that 
we apply T( ) and FE only with respect to FVar(A) и {b } . 
Г ' , is a Hintikka-element with respect to FVar 
ο , 1+1 
(Г t' Li '' and Г~' Î4.1 is f ± n i t e · 
O, 1+1 O, ±+1 
If Г ' , . contains ТВ and FB for some formula B, then we 
o, 1+1 
add Tf to Г a" !? . . 
o, 1+1 
Having finished step 1 of our procedure, we have one 
(if Τ ν, F& and Τ ·*• have nowhere been applied) or more 
partial trees of the form 
where each Γ . is a Hintikka-element with respect to 
o,i 
FVar(Γ . ) and each Γ is finite. 
o,i o,i 
Step 2 simply repeats this process, giving successors 
i, І, к 
Г 
о, m, η 
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Having finished step 2 of our procedure, we have one 
(if Τ V, F&, Τ -»• have nowhere been applied) or more partial 
trees of the form: 
Γ0,1,1 Γ0,1,3 Γ0,2,2 Γ0,3,1 Γ0,4,3 
\y \i/ \y л/ 
г г г г 
0,1 0,2 ^,3 ^,4 
Г0 
The other steps of our procedure are similar. 
Definition 2.3: We call the trees, which we get by our 
systematic procedure for searching a derivation of A in 
IPC, search trees for A, or search trees starting with FA. 
Notice, there may be many search trees for A, because of the 
rules Τ V, Fa, Τ -»• . 
Example 2.4: We apply our systematic procedure for searching 
a derivation of (χ) (P(x) ν Q) -*• (χ) (P(x)) ν Q in IPC. 
Step 0 yields: F (χ) (Ρ (χ) V Q) -*• (χ) (Ρ (χ) ) ν Q. 
Step 1 yields two partial trees, namely 
I TP(v ) 
TP(v ) V Q, F(x)P(x), FQ 
T(x)(P(x) V Q ) , F(x)(P(x)) V Q F(x)(P(x) V Q) -»-(χ) (Ρ (χ)) ν Q 
F(x)(P(x) V Q) -> (x)(P(x)) V Q 
II 
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TQ 
TP(v ) V Q , F (χ) Ρ (χ), FQ 
Τ (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν Q), F (χ) (Ρ (χ)) v Q F(x)(P(x)vQ) -»• (x) (P(x) ) ν Q 
F (χ) (Ρ (χ) ν Q) -ν (χ) (Ρ (χ) ) ν Q 
Step 2 yields many more partial trees. 
One of the partial trees, corresponding with I is: 
TPtv^ , TQ 
TPCv^ ν Q, TP(v2) ν Q 
T(x)(P(x)ν Q ) , FP(v2) 
TP(v2) 
TP(v2) ν Q 
TPCVj) 
T P C v ^ v Q , F(x)P(x), FQ 
T(x)(P(x)v Q ) , F(x)(P(x))
v
 Q Γ0,2,1 Γ0,2,2 
TPiv^ 
TP(v )VQ, F(x)P(x), FQ 
Τ (χ) (Ρ (Χ) V Q) , F (χ) (Ρ (χ) ) V Q 0,2 
F(x)(P(x)VQ) -*- (x)(P(x))VQ 
Where Γ
ο 2 is F (χ) (P(x)v Q) -> (χ) (Ρ (χ)) ν Q , 
Γ0,2,1 i s те( 1> 
TPÍv^V Q, F(x) (Ρ(χ)), FQ 
T(X)(P(X)VQ) , F (Χ) (P(X))V Q 
and r 0 2 2
 i s F ( x )
 ( ρ( χ> ν Q) "* (χ) (P(x))v Q-
Example 2.5: We apply our systematic procedure for searching 
a derivation of (x) (P(x))v Q -*• (χ) (Ρ(χ)ν Q) in IPC. 
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Step 0 yields: F (χ) (Ρ (χ) ) V Q •*• (χ) (Ρ (χ) V Q) 
Step 1 yields two partial trees, namely 
I 
TPCVj) 
T(x)P(x) 
T(X) (P(X)) V Q, F(X) (P(X) V Q) F(x) (P(X)) V Q -»• (χ) (P(x) V Q) 
F(x) (Ρ(χ)) v Q -»• (χ) (P(x) v Q) 
II 
TQ 
T(x)(P(x))v Q, F(x) (P(x) ν Q) F(x) (P(x)) v Q -> (x) (P(x) v Q) 
F(x) (P(x)) ν Q •+ (x) (P(x) ν Q) 
Applying step 2 we get again two partial trees, namely one 
corresponding with I and the second corresponding with II: 
I* 
Tf 
TP(V2) 
TPtv^ 
T(x)P(x), FP(v 2), FQ 
T(x) (P(x)) V Q, FP(v2) V Q 
TP(V ) F(x)(P(x))V Q + (x) (P(x) V Q) 
T(x)P(x) 
T(x)(P(x)) V Q, F(x)(P(x) V Q) 
F(x) (P(X)) V Q ->• (x) (P(x) V Q) 
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II' 
Tf 
TQ, FPCv^ , FQ 
T(X) (P(x)) V Q, FPÍv^ ν Q 
TQ 
T(x)(P(x))V Q, F(x)(P(x) V Q) F(x)(P(x))v Q+(x)(P(x)v Q) 
F(x)(P(x)) VQ -v (x) (P(x) V Q) 
Notice, we have found now a derivation of (x) (P(x)) ν Q -»· 
(x)(P(x) V Q) in IPC, namely the following: 
T(x)(Px)v Q, T(x)Px, TPv, FPv2 ,FQ 
T(x)(Px)v Q, T(x)Px, TPv2 , FPv vQ T(x)(Px)vQ, TQ, FPv , FQ 
T(x)(Px)v Q, T(x)Px, FPv ν Q T(x)(Px)vQ, TQ, FPv ν Q 
T(x)(Px)v Q, T(x)Px, F(x)(PxvQ) T(x)(Px)vQ, TQ, F(x)(PxvQ) 
T(x) (Px) ν Q, F(x) (Pxv Q) 
F(x) (Px) V Q (x) (Pxv Q) 
Remark 2.6: From the description of the systematic procedure 
for searching a derivation of A in IPC, it will be clear, 
that we can give to all our search trees the tree structure 
of U
 I N
n
. 
η 
We can also modify the search procedure in an appropriate 
way, such that we give to all our search trees the tree 
structure of u{0,l} . 
η 
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Notation : SEQ is by definition UIN . 
η 
Definition 2.7: A search tree for A is closed iff for some 
s e SEQ, Tf occurs at the node s. 
We will show now, that if all search trees for A are closed, 
then |— A. 
Therefore we need the following 
Lemma 2.8: The collection of all search trees for A is a fan 
F.. 
Proof: Let s. , s. , s_ ,... be a fixed enumeration of SEQ , 
such that if s. is an initial segment of s. , then i < j. 
For example: 
Since each set of signed formulas, associated with an 
s e SEQ, is finite, we can identify a search tree for A 
with a sequence η , η , n_ ,..., of natural numbers, 
where - see the picture -
the Gödel-number of 
procedure to {FA} . 
the Gôdel-numbe 
procedure to η 
η is a result of applying our systematic 
n. is ö r of a result of applying our systematic 
56 
n2 i s 
η i s 
η . i s 4 
η i s 
* · · 
• · · 
• · · 
. . . 
. . . η 0 
. . . η 1 
. . . η 0 
. . . η 
From this we see that the search trees for A form a fan 
F . q.e.d. 
Theorem 2.9: If all search trees for A are closed, then 
I- A-
More explicitly: If for all t e F there is some natural 
number η such that Tf occurs in t(n), then I—A. 
Proof: Suppose for all t e F there is some η e IN such 
that Tf occurs in t(n). 
Then, we know by the fan-theorem: 
There is some natural number, say N, such that for all 
t e F there is seme η, η < N, such that Tf occurs in t(n). 
Because F is a fan, there are only finitely many different 
t N with t e F , say t Ν ,..., L Ν. 
Together they form a derivation of A. 
Hence |— A. 
q.e.d. 
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§3 Soundness and Completeness. 
In this section we want to establish the soundness and the 
completeness of the formal system, described in section 1, 
of this chapter II, with respect to the semantics of 
chapter I, section 2 (definition 2.1 , 2.2 and 2.8). 
The completeness proof, which we will give here, is a 
detailed elaboration of the sketch we gave in chapter I, 
section 3, theorem 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, in which we made use 
of the author's completeness proof with respect to 
Beth-models [ll] . 
Let A be a formula. 
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness); If (— A, then )= A. 
Proof: By induction on the length of a derivation of A in 
IPC. 
In order to establish the completeness theorem we wish to 
show that any search tree for A can be interpreted as a 
model M = <S W ,T >. 
M M 
Lemma 3.2: Each search tree for A has the following property: 
To each s e SEQ is associated a set of signed formulas, 
which we will also denote with s , such that for each 
s e SEQ: 
1. If there is a formula B, such that ТВ and FB both occur 
in s , then Tf occurs in s. 
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2. Each s is a Hintikka element (see definition 2.1) with 
respect to the set of free variables, which occur in the 
signed formulas of s. 
3. If TA occurs in s , then for all s' e SEQ, if s is an 
initial segment of s', then TA also occurs in s'. 
4. If FB(v. ,..., ν ) occurs in s , then there is some 
1 m 
infinitely proceeding sequence α through s , such that for 
all к e IN, if к > length (s), then FB (v. ,..., ν ) 
1 m 
occurs in ode. 
5. If FB ν С occurs in s , then there is some infinitely 
proceeding sequence α through s , such that for all к 
> length (s) both FB and FC occur in ok. 
6. If F(Ex)B(x) occurs in s , then there is some infinitely 
proceeding sequence ct through s , such that for all 
natural numbers i there is some к such that for all 
1 > к FB (ν ) occurs in αϊ. 
7. If T(Ex)B(x) occurs in s , then for all infinitely 
proceeding sequences α through s there is some natural 
number i and some к , such that ТВ (v.) occurs in ok. 
8. If T(x)B(x) occurs in s , then for all infinitely 
proceeding sequences α through s and for all natural 
numbers i there is some к , such that ТВ(v.) occurs in 
äk. 
9. If FB-»C occurs in s , then there is an s' e SEQ, such 
that s is an initial segment of s' , and such that both 
ТВ and FC occur in s' . 
10.If F(x)B(x) occurs in s , then there is an s'e SEQ and a 
natural number i, such that s is an initial segment of s' 
and FB(v.) occurs in s'. 
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Proof: Immediate from the description of the systematic 
procedure for searching a derivation of A in IPC; the 
infinitely proceeding sequence α , of which the existence 
is claimed in 4,5 and 6, is obtained by a succession of 
b-steps in the search procedure (definition 2.2). 
q.e.d. 
Definition 3.3 (Interpretation of a search tree as a model) 
For t a search tree for A, (teF.), define M(t) =< S,... , 
A M (t) 
Τ ... > as follows: 
M(t; 
i) S . . is the spread law, which allows just those 
M(t) 
sequences, which are in the search tree t. 
By remark 2.6 S
w
,., can be taken fixed for all teF, , 
M (t) A 
namely the universal spread law (or the binary spread 
law) . 
i i ) For < a . , . . . , a. > allowed by the spread law S
m
 . . . , 
U X M ( t ) 
TM(t) ( < a o V ( < p ' n i V ) = 1 
·«* TP (v , . . . , ν ) occurs in <a , . . . , a, > . 
η. η o k 1 m 
Then by 3 i n lemma 3.2 , i f 
TM(t) ( < a 0 " • · ' а
к
>
И < Р і г^ , . . . , n
m
>) = 1, then a l s o 
TM(t) ( < a o \ ' a k + i > > ( < p ' n i " · · V * = ^ 
Hence we have 
Lemma 3.4: For t a search t r e e for A (teP ) , M(t) , as 
defined in 3.3, i s a model in the sense of 
d e f i n i t i o n 2.1 of chapter I . 
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Now, the completeness theorem will follow from theorem 
2.9 and the following 
Theorem 3.5: Let t^ F be a search tree for A and let A 
M = M(t) be the corresponding model (definition 3.3). 
Then for alls e SEO and for all formulas B(v ,...,v ): 
η. η 1 m 
I. If TB(v ,...,v ) occurs in s , then for all 
η . η 1 m 
i n f i n i t e l y proceeding sequences α through s , 
M И= Β(ν , . , . , ν )[ η , . . . , η ] . 
α η . η 1 m 1 m 
(see definition 2.12 of chapter I) 
II. If FB(v ,.... ν ) occurs in s and for all infinitely 
η. η 1 m 
proceeding sequences α through s , M t= 
Β(ν ,...,ν )[ η. ,..., η ] , then Μ explodes. 
η. η 1 m 1 m 
Proof: By induction on the complexity of B. 
1. Suppose TP(v ,..., ν ) occurs in s. 
η. η 1 m 
Then for each α through s there is some к such that 
TP (ν ,.... ν ) occurs in ak. 
η. η 1 m 
Hence for each α through s there is some к such that 
Τ (ok)(<P, η ,..., η >) = 1 . 
м i m 
Hence for all α through s , 
ι 
Μ \= Ρ (ν ,..., ν )[η ,..., η ] . 
α η. η 1 m 1 m 
Suppose FP(v ,...» ν ) occurs in s (i) and for all 
η. η 1 , m 
α through s , M И Ρ Ov ,..., ν )[ η ,... ,η ] (ϋ). 
α η. η ι m 1 m 
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From i it follows by 4 of lemma 3.2 that there is some 
a through s such that for all к > length(s) 
FP(v ,.,.,ν ) occurs in ok. 
η. η 1 m 
For this α it follows from ii that either M explodes 
or for some 1 , TP(v ,..., ν ) occurs in αϊ. 
η. η 1 m 
In both cases it follows that M explodes. 
В = С & D : Use 2 of lemma 3.2. 
В = С V D : Use, to establish I, 2 of lemma 3.2. 
To establish II, suppose FCv D occurs in s (i) and for 
all α through s M (i С ν D (ii) 
From i it follows by 5 of lemma 3.2 that there is some 
α through s , such that for all к > length (s) both FC 
and FD occur in ok. 
ι ι 
For this α we know by ii that M fc= С or M h= D. 
α α 
Suppose M \= С. Then by lemma I, 2.13 it follows that 
there is some 1 such that for all β , if ßl = öl, then 
м3 μ с. 
Now FC occurs in αϊ and for all 0 through αϊ, 
M6 μ с. 
Hence, by induction hypothesis, M explodes. 
В = С -*• D 
Suppose TC ->-D occurs in s. 
We have to show that for all α through s , M [= С -»• D, 
α 
i.e. for all α through s there is some к e IN, such that 
for all β, if ßk = äk and W (¿C, then M Ç= D. 
ρ Ρ 
To each α through s take к = length (s). 
Suppose now, that ßk = ak and M (= С. 
ρ 
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Then by I, 2.13 it follows that there is some 1 e IN, 
1 > к such that for all γ , if γΐ = "¡jl, then M h= C. 
Ύ 
By 3 of lemma 3.2 TC -»• D occurs in gl and by 2 of 
lemma 3.2 either FC or TD occurs in pi. 
If TD occurs in pi, then by induction hypothesis M \= D. 
_ P 
If FC occurs in 31, then, because for all У through 
01, M (= С, by the induction hypothesis, M explodes and 
' j 
hence also M =^ D. 
ρ 
Suppose FC -»• D occurs in s (i) and for all α through 
s , M bL С ->• D (ii). 
a 
From i it follows by 9 of lemma 3.2 that there is some 
s'e SEQ, such that s is an initial segment of s' and such 
that both TC and FD occur in s'. 
By 3 and 4 of lemma 3.2 there is some ρ through s' such 
that for all 1 > length (s') both TC and FD occur in pi. 
ι 
By induction hypothesis M t= C, and hence by ii, 
,
 B 
M 0 И D; Hence by I, 2.13 there is some m such that for 
β
 - , 
all γ through Pm, M t= D. 
_ Y - ι 
Now FD occurs in pm and for all γ through pm, M N D ; 
so from the induction hypothesis it follows that M 
explodes. 
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5 В = (х)С(х) 
Suppose Τ(χ)С(χ) occurs in s. 
By 8 of lemma 3.2, for all α through s and for all 
natural numbers η there іэ some к such that TC(v ) occurs 
η 
in ok. Hence, by induction hypothesis , for all
 α
 through 
s and for all η e IN, M И С(ν) [η] . 
α 
Hence for all α through s , M f= (χ) С(χ) . 
а 
Suppose F(χ)С(χ) occurs in s (i) and for all о through 
s , Μ
α
 N= (x)C(x) (ii). 
From i it follows by 10 of lemma 3.2 that there is an 
s' e SEQ and a natural number η , such that s is an 
initial segment of s' and such that FC(ν ) occurs in s '. 
By 4 of lemma 3.2 there is some α through s' such that for 
all 1 > length (s'Jr FC (ν ) occurs in öl. 
For this α there is by ii some к such that for all 
natural numbers m and for all ß through Ok, 
M3 t= c < v m > [ m ] · 
So FC(v ) occurs in ok and for all 3 through ok, 
M =^ C(v ) [n] . Hence by the induction hypothesis, 
M explodes. 
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6. В = (Ex)С(χ) 
Suppose Τ(Ex)С(χ) occurs in s. 
Then by 7 of lemma 3.2 it follows that for all α through 
s there is some η e IN and some к such that TCfv ) occurs 
η 
in ok. 
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for all α through s 
there is some η e IN such that M |= C(v )Γ η] . 
α η 
Hence for all α through s , M И (Ex)С(χ). 
Suppose F(Ex)С(χ) occurs in s (i) and for all a through s, 
Μ
α
 |=L (Ex)C(x) (ii). 
From i it follows by 6 of lemma 3.2 that there is some 
о through s , such that for all η e IN there is some 
k(n) such that for all 1 > k(n) FC(v ) occurs in αϊ. 
η 
For this α it follows from ii that there is some m e IN 
such that M bc С (ν ) [ml . 
α m 
By lemma I, 2.13, for this α there is some m ε IN and 
some ρ > к(m) such that for all 0 through ap, 
Μ μ= C(vJ [m] . 
ρ m 
Now FC(ν ) occurs in ap and for all β through ap, 
M ^ C(v ) [m] . 
Ρ m 
Hence it follows from the induction hypothesis that 
M explodes. 
FC(v ) 
m 
F(Ex)C(x) q.e.d. 
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Theorem 3.6 (Completeness of the formal system of II, 
section 1 with respect to the semantics of I, section 2): 
If 1= A (v ,..., ν ), then |— A (v ,..., ν ) . 
η. η η. η 
l m l m 
Proof: Suppose |= Α(ν ,..., ν ) . 
1 m 
Then by I, 3.6 H A(v ,..., ν ) (definition 2.12 
of chapter I). 
Hence for all search trees te F, , M(t) t=. A(v ,...,v ), 
Α η. η 1 m 
while FA (ν ,..., ν ) occurs in the bottom node s of all 
η η о 
trees t €F . So, by theorem 3.5 , for all search trees 
teF, , M(t) explodes, i.e. for all search trees teF, there A A 
is some η elN such that Tf occurs in t(n). In other words: 
all search trees for A(v ,..., ν ) are closed. 
η. η 1 m 
Hence, by theorem 2.9,1— A(v ,.,.,ν ) . 
η. η 1 m 
q.e.d. 
Let Ε. , , Ε and A be formulas. 
1 η 
If we replace in step 0 of the systematic procedure for 
searching a derivation of A in IPC (definition 2.2) {FA} 
by {TE , ..., TE , FA } , then we get a systematic 
procedure for searching a derivation of A from Ε, ,..., E 
1 η 
in IPC. 
Hence the proof of theorem 3.6 can be generalized to a 
proof of 
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Theorem 3.7: If E. ,..., E |= A(I, definition 2.8), then 1 η 
E. ,..., E 1— A (II, definition 1.3). 1 η 
For Γ a countably infinite sequence of formulas we can 
even modify the systematic procedure of definition 2.2 to a 
systematic procedure for searching a derivation of A from 
Γ in IPC. Hence we can generalize theorem 3.6 to a strong 
completeness theorem: 
Theorem 3.8: Let Γ be a countably infinite sequence of 
formulas. 
If Γ |= A (I,definition 2.8), then Γ |— A 
(II, definition 1.3). 
Remark 3.9: If we start the systematic procedure, described 
in definition 2.2 with {TC} instead of with {FA} , then we 
get a fan (lemma 2.8) of models (lemma 3.4) of С (theorem 
3.5). 
More precisely, for each model M in the fan, M \=-C 
(we do not have M H С ! ) . 
Remark 3.10: As pointed out by A. Troelstra in [ 16] , we 
have, as a consequence of the completeness proof in 
theorem 3.6, obtained an intuitionistic model-theoretic 
proof of the fact that our formal system of section 1 is 
closed under cut, where cut is the rule: 
ТВ, ,..., ТВ, , FA ТА, TC, ,...,TC , FD, ,...,FD 
I K ι m 1 η 
Cut 
TBj ,..,, TBk , TC1 ,... TCm, FD1 ,..., FDn 
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To see this, note that the derivability of 
S = { ΤΑ, , .. ., ΤΑ , FB. , .. ., FB } is equivalent to : 1 n i m 
for each model M (I, definition 2.1) and for each admissible 
infinitely proceeding sequence a , if M =^ A. & ... & A , 
then M
а
 f= В v...VB . 
Assume {ТВ ,..., ТВ , FA} and {ТА , ТС , .·.., TC , 
FD. ,..., FD } to be derivable. (*) 
1 η 
Now consider any model M and any admissible infinitely 
proceeding sequence a. 
If M t= B. &...& B, & C. &...& С , then, by (*) 
a ^ 1 к 1 m 
M M A and hence, again by (*) , M И D, V...V D 
α α 1 η 
It follows that {ТВ, ,..., ТВ, , TC, ,..., TC , 1 X I m 
FD, ,..., FD } is derivable. 1 η 
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III F I R S T S T E P S IN I N T U I T I O N I S T I C 
M O D E L T H E O R Y . 
In this chapter we will do some modeltheory with respect 
to the models, defined in chapter I, and, as in chapter I 
and II, we will work again in intuitionistic metamathematics. 
In this chapter we will only consider models 
M = < S, Τ >, where S is one fixed spreadlaw for all M 
models Μ , namely the universal spreadlaw. That we can 
restrict ourselves to this class of models is a consequence 
of the completeness proof in chapter II (see remark 2.6 , 
chapter II). 
The main tools in this chapter will be two model-
constructions : 
i) In section 1 we will consider, under a certain 
condition С(M , M, s), the construction of a model 
о 
R(M , M, s) from two models M and M with respect to 
о о 
the finite sequence s. 
ii) In section 2 we will construct from an infinite 
sequence Μ , Μ , M ,... of models a new model 
Σ M 
i e IN i 
Syntactic proofs of the disjunction property and the 
explicit definability theorem are wellknown (see for 
example chapter II, section 1). С Smorynski [17] gave 
semantic proofs of these theorems with respect to Kripke 
models, however using classical metamathematics. In section 
1 we will give intuitionistically correct, semantic, 
proofs with respect to the models, defined in chapter I, 
using Brouwer's Continuity Principle. 
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Let W be the fan of all models(see chapter I, 
theorem 2.7)and let Γ be a countably infinite sequence of 
sentences. 
We will prove in section 2: 
1 1 ( А )
А6Г ( E M ) M e W ( n o t M ^ А ) 
( E M )Mew ( A ) Aer
 ( n 0 t M
 ^
Α )
· 
L i ) ( M )MeW ( Ε Α )ΑβΓ ( M ^ A ) 
( Ε Α )
ΑβΓ
 ( M )MeW ( M ^ A ) · 
ii) has already been proved in I, corollary 3.4. But in this 
chapter we will give another proof, using Brouwer's 
Continuity Principle and purely semantic arguments. 
In I we have already shown two versions of the 
compactness theorem (corollary 3.3 and 3.8). In section 2 
we will also prove some other versions. 
The independence of the intuitionistic connectives V , 
& , -»• and - will be studied in section 3, using results 
from section 1. 
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§1. Submodels; Deduction theorem; The model R(M , M, s); 
о 
Disjunction property; Explicit definability theorem. 
Let s and s' be finite sequences of natural numbers. 
Definition 1.1: s R s' = s' is a successor of s, i.e. there 
are natural numbers n, a, ,...,& , m and b. ,..., b such 
I n 1 m 
that s = <a.. 
If s = <a ,. 
^ 1 an 
If s = <a ,. 
s *ßg <3ι ,. 
, a > and s' = <a ,..., a r b ,...,b >. 
., a > and s' =< b. ,..., b >, then s*s' = 
η l m D 
1 m 
., a > and β =< Ь. , Ь„ ,...> , then 
η I ¿ 
ι ä_ f b. , b 0 ,. . . >. 
η 1 ¿ 
< > is the empty sequence. 
Definition 1.2: Let M = <S, Τ > be a model and let s be a 
' M 
finite sequence. 
M(s) = <S, Τ > is the submodel of M, defined by 
Τ
Μί = ·> ( S ,H < P' n , '·•·' n
m
 >) F тм (3*3') (<P, η ,.,.,η >) M(s; 1  D M l m 
for each m-ary predicate symbol P, for each m-tuple 
<n. ,..., η > of natural numbers and for each m e IN. 
1 m 
M(s) 
M 
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Lemma 1.3: Let M(s) be a submodel of M. 
Then for all admissible a, for all formulas A and for all 
00 
a e IN 
M(s) fc= A [a] iff M 1= A [a] 
a ' s *α ' 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
Theorem 1.4 (Deduction theorem): Let A and В be formulas. 
The following propositions are equivalent: 
i) f= A -> В 
ii) A (= В 
iii) For all models M e w and for all a eIN , if M Ц= Ά [a] 
then Μ μ= В [а] . 
Proof: M =^- А -*• В «· for all a and for all a e IN , if 
M H A [a] , then M p= В [a] . 
From this it easily follows that t= A -»• В and A |= В are 
equivalent. 
Also ii) -*- iii) is immediate. 
iii) •*• ii) : Suppose iii). We have to show that for all 
models M e w , for all admissible α and for all a e IN , if 
M |= A [a] , then Μ |= В [ a] . 
So suppose M |= A [ a] . 
Then by lemma I, 1.4 there is some к e IN such that for all 
admissible β, if ßk = äk, then M0 (= A [ a] . 
_ ρ 
So M(otk) h= A [ a] (see definition 1.2). Hence by iii) 
M(äk) |= В [a] .So (lemma 1.3) for all β through äk, 
M |= В [a] .In particular, M (= В [ a] . 
q.e.d. 
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Let M = <S, Τ > and M = <S, Τ > be models and let s be 
ο M M 
о 
a finite sequence. In order to give an intuitionistically 
correct, semantic, proof of the disjunction property and the 
explicit definability theorem, we define a condition 
C(M , M , s) on M , M and s : 
о о 
Definition 1.5: С(M , M, s) = for all m-ary predicate 
symbols P, for all m-tuples < n, ,..., η > of natural 
1 m 
numbers and for all m e IN, if T., (s) (<P , η. ,..., η >) = 1, 
м i m 
о 
then Τ (< >)(<Ρ, η, ,..., η > ) = 1. 
Μ l m 
(< > denotes the empty sequence). 
If С(M , M, s) holds, then we can built from M and M 
о о 
a new model R(M , M, s) by replacing in the model M the 
о о 
submodel M (s) by the model M ; more precisely: 
Definition 1.6: Under the condition C(M , M , s ) 
о 
let R(M , M , s) by the model N = <S , Τ > defined by 
Ο N 
Т
ы
 (s,)(<P, η ,..., η >) = Τ (s,)(<P, η. ,..., η >) 
Ν ι m Μ l m 
о 
if not s R s' 
Т
ы
 (s1)(<?, η ,..., η >) = Τ (s")(<Ρ, η. ,..., η > ) if 
Ν 1 m Μ l m 
s' = s * s" 
Ν 
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In order to know that N = R(M , M , s) is a model, we 
о 
have to check that 
if Τ (< a, ,..., a > )(< P, n, ,..., η > ) = 1, then 
ы ι η ι m 
Τ (< a, ,..., a .>) (< Ρ, η. ,..., η > ) = 1, which holds 
Ν 1 η+1 1 m 
because of the condition С(Μ , M , s). 
о 
Lemma 1.7: Suppose С(M , M, s) and let N = R(M , M, s). 
о о 
œ 
Then for all α , for all formulas A and for all a eIN 
N (=. A [a] iff M (= A [a] 
s*a ~ a ^ 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
Theorem 1.8 (Disjunction property): Let A and В be 
sentences. 
If ^ A V B, then (= A or |= B. 
Proof: Suppose |= A V B, i.e. for all models M e W 
and for a l l a , M U = A o r M t = B · 
a a 
Hence, for each <M, α > e W χ σ , there is η e {0,1} , 
ω 
such that (η=0 and M (= A) or (n=l and M 1= В). 
α α 
(σ is the universal spread) 
ω 
By the continuity-principle we can conclude: 
2 
For each <M, α > e w χ σ , there are <k. , k„> e IN 
ω 1 2 
and η e IN, such that for all <N, 0 > e W χ σ , 
ω 
if Ñk = Mk and ßk = äk , then (η = 0 and Ν (= A) or 
1 1 ¿ £, ρ 
(η=1 and Ν
β
 |= Β) 
Now, let Μ be defined by T. (s) (<P, n. ,..., η >) = 0 
о M i m 
о 
for all finite sequences s and for all 
<P , n1 , ..., ю 
for all к e IN. 
η . , η >. And let о be defined by о (к) = О 1 m — — 
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Then t h e r e are к and k 9 and a number n e { 0 , l b such t h a t 
for a l l N e w and for a l l β e σ if Nk. = M к. and 
1 о 1 ßk. = о k_ , then (n=0 and N 0 |= A) or (n=l and N0 |= B) 2 - 2 Ρ Ρ 
(*) 
Looking at the coding of M as an infinite sequence of 
natural numbers in the proof of I, theorem 2.7, we see that 
in M к. only information is given about finitely many 
о 1 
nodes, say s. ,..., s 
1 Ρ 
For simplicity we can suppose that k„ > length (s.) for 
all i , 1 < i < p. 
(**) 
Proposition: if η = 0 , then (= A 
if η = 1 , then Ν В 
Proof of proposition: Suppose η = 0 and let M e w be 
given. Let s = о k_* < 1 > . 
о D - 2 
Because C(M , M, s ) holds, we can construct the model 
о о 
Ν = R(M , M , s ) . 
о о 
о к
п 
75 
Then, by (**) N к. = M к, . 
1 O l 
Hence, because η = 0, by (*) , for all β, if ¡Зк = о к , 
then N0 (= A. 
ρ 
Hence, for all β through s , N 0 t= A. 
ο ρ 
So, by lemma 1.7, for all β , Μ. μ= A; i.e. M И A. 
Ρ 
So we have shown that M \= A for all Me W, i.e. ^= A, 
in case η = 0. 
In case η = 1 we find in an analogous way =^ B. 
q.e.d. 
In a way analogous to the proof of theorem 1.8, one 
proves 
Theorem 1.9 (Explicit definability): Let (Ex)A(x) be a 
sentence. 
If |= (Ex)A(x), then there is η e IN such that 
\= A (v) [n ] . 
Lemma 1.10: Let (x)A(x) be a sentence. 
(= (x)A(x) iff for all η e IN, f= A(v) [ n] . 
Proof: μ. (x)A(x) (see I, definition 2.2 and 2.8) 
·»· for all M, for all α and for all η e IN, Μ N= A(v)[ η 
«· for all η e IN, for all M and for all α, Μ =^ A(v)[ η 
«• for all ne IN, И Α (ν) [η] . 
q.e.d. 
Modifying the proof of theorem 1.8 we get 
Theorem 1.11: Let Ρ and Q be propositional variables; 
A and В sentences. 
i) If H (P->Ç>) -*- A V В, then К (P-^ Q) -> A or |= (P->Q)->-
ii) If И (P&Q) •+• A V B, then F= (p8lQ) "*" A or |= (P&Q)-»-
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Remark: This theorem will be useful in establishing 
independence-results for the connectives v, a, -> 
and - (§ 3). 
For a more general formulation of a syntactic analogue of 
this theorem see S.C. Kleene [ 24] . 
Proof ; i) Suppose |= (P ·*• Q) -»• A V B, i.e. for all 
M e w and for all a, if M |= Ρ -> Q, then 
M (= A or M H B . 
Now it is easy to see that the models M, such that if 
T
w
(s) (P) = 1, then T
w
(s) (Q) = 1 form a fan, say W(P -»• Q) , M M 
which is a subfan of W. From ^ (P -*• Q) •*• Α ν В it 
follows that for all models M e W (Ρ -»• Q) and for all 
α , M t= A or Μ H B · 
' α ^  α ^ 
Using Brouwer's continuity principle we can conclude: 
For each <M,a > e W (P -*• Q) χ σ , there are <k4 ,k„ > 
- ω 1 2 
e IN and η e IN such that for all <Ν,β > e w(P -»• 0) χ σ 
ω 
if Ñk = Mk and ßk, = ак2 , then (η = 0 and Ν β |= A) or 
(η = 1 and Ν. Ν Β). 
Ρ 
Now, let Μ be defined by T„ (s) (R) = 0 for all 
о M 
о 
propositional variables R and for all finite sequences s. 
And let о be defined by о (к) = 0 for all к e IN. 
Clearly M e W (Ρ -+• Q) and hence there are k. and k_ 
and a number η e {0,1} , such that for all N e w (P -»- Q) 
and for all β e σ , if Ñk. = M к. and ßk. = о k„ , then 
ω l o i 2 - 2 
(η = о and Ν. |= A) or (η = 1 eind N 0 H= B) . Ы 
Ρ Ρ 
Looking at the coding of M as an infinite sequence of 
natural numbers in the proof of I, theorem 2.7, we see 
that in M к. only information is given about finitely 
many nodes, say s. ,..., s 
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For simplicity we can suppose that k 9 > length (s.) for 
all i < p. (**) 
Proposition: if η = 0, then И (Ρ •*· Q) -»• A 
if η = 1, then |= (P •*• Q) -»• В 
Proof of proposition: Suppose η = 0. Let M e w, α e σ 
and suppose M И Ρ "*• Q · 
Then there is some к e IN (lemma I, 1.4) such that for 
all β, if Bk = äk, then M0 t= Ρ •+ Q. 
Now consider the submodel M(ak) (see definition 1.2). 
By lemma 1.3, M(äk) И p "*" Q· 
Because not necessarily M(ak) e W (P -»• Q ) , we construct 
a model M such that 
(1) M* e W (P •> Q) and 
(2) M(äk) a И= С iff М*„ (= С for all β and for all 
Ρ Ρ 
formulas С. 
Namely, define M = <S, Τ *> by T„*(s)(R) = T
w
,-, . (s)(R) if 
M M M(CtK) 
R jí Q and 
V ( s ) ( Q ) = 1 if T M (- k ) (s)(Q) = 1 or 
TM(5k) (S)(p) - 1 
= 0 otherwise 
Let s = о k„ * <1>. 
о D - 2 
Because the condition C(M , M* , s ) is satisfied, 
о о 
we can construct the model N = R (M , M* , s ) . 
о о 
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M к, 
о 1 
Then, by ( * * ) , N к. = Μ к , . Also N e w (Ρ •* Q) . 
1 O l 
So, because η = 0, by (*) , for a l l β , i f fik = о к then 
Ν
β
 И Α. 
Hence for all β through s , N. И Α. 
ο ρ 
Hence, by lemma 1.7 , M* |= A for all β . 
ρ 
So, by (2) , M(äk)0 |= A for all β. P 
Then, by lemma 1.3, M (=- A for all β. 
äk*ß 
So, in particular, M И A. 
And |= (P -»• Q)-»· A, in case η = 0, has been proved. 
In case η = 1 we find in an analogous way, t= (P ·*• Q) -»• B. 
q.e.d. 
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ii) The proof of ii) is analogous to the proof of i) with 
two modifications : 
Instead of W (P ->• Q) consider now the fan И (P & Q) of 
all models M such that Τ (< >) (Ρ) = Τ (< >) (Q) 
M M 
= 1. And define M , by Τ (s) (Ρ) = Τ (s) (Q) = 1 
О M M 
o o 
for all finite sequences s and Τ (s) 
M 
(< R, η. ,..., η >) = 0 for all 0R Φ P, R Φ Q and 1 m 
for all s. 
q.e.d. 
Remark: Let (*) denote: if f— С -»• A V В, then f— С -»• A 
or |— С -»• В. 
In [23] R, Harrop proved that, under a condition RH on С, 
(*) holds in the intuitionistic propositional calculus. 
In [24] S.C. Kleene shows that, under a weaker but not 
effective restriction С j С on С than Harrop's R H , (*) 
holds in the intuitionistic propositional and predicate 
calculus. 
One might hope to be able to prove the semantic analogue 
of (*) by a method, analogous to the proof of theorem 1.8 
and 1.11. 
As in remark 3.9 of chapter II, one can construct a fan of 
models, such that for each model M in the fan, 
M M= С (for the definition of M И С see I, 2.12). 
However, the analogue of lemma 1.7 with (= instead of H : 
ι ι 
If N = R (M , M , s), then Ν H A * Μ И= A 
о s*ot a 
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does not hold, because it may happen that N explodes, while 
M does not explode. 
For cut-free systems there is a proof of the property (*), 
under Harrop's condition R H on С , in [ 27, page 55] and 
in [ 29 , page 336] . 
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52 The model ^Σ „ M. ; Uniformity Properties; 
Compactness theorems. 
Given an infinite sequence of models M , i e IN, we can 
construct a new model .Σ,
т ж т
 M. as follows : 
i CIN i 
Definition 2.1: . ΐ
 τ
„ Μ. is the model M = <S, Τ > 
ι e IN i M 
defined by: 
T
w
 (о к) (<P, п. ,..., η > ) = 0 for all к e IN, for all 
м - ι m 
m-ary predicate symbols Ρ and for all m-tuples 
<n, ,..., η > of natural numbers (o is defined by 1 m -
о (к) = 0 for all к e I N ) ; 
and for all i > 1 (see the picture) 
т
м
 (<i
'
 ai V » = т м ( <&. V 5 
т
м
 ( < 0
'
 i
 '
 ai '··•' a k > ) = тм ( < ai " · · ' a k > ) 
т
м
 (<0
'
 0
'
 i
'
 ai "··' S*) = тм ( < a 
о 
ι '··•'
 a k > ) 
T„ (<o, o, o, i, a. ,..., a.>) = Τ (<a. , 
M. 
т
м ^
<0
'
 0
'
 0
'
 0
'
 i
'
 ai '··" ^ъ*) = тм ( <а. 
Т
м
 (<o, о, о, о, o, i, a 1 ,..., ak>) = T M (<a1 ,..., ak> ) 
о 
and so on. (We consider successively M , M. ; M , M. , 
о 1 о 1 
М2 '' Мо ' М1 ' М2 ' М3 f М о ' М1 ' М2 ' М3 ' М 4 '" a n d 
so on) 
M 
<o,o> M. 
<o> 
M — . и ___ M. 
ι e IN i 
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Lemma 2.2: Let M = .Σ „, Μ. and let о be defined by 
ι e IN ι 
о (к) = 0 for all к e IN. 
co 
For all formulas A and for all a e IN : 
if M N A [a ] , then M. |= A [ a] for all i e IN. 
Proof: Suppose M И A [ a] and let i e IN. 
By lemma 2.4 of chapter I, there is some к e IN such that 
for all 3 , if gk = ôk , then Μ N A [ a] . (1) 
~ _ ρ 
Take 1 > к such that Τ (о 1 * <1> ) = Τ (< >) . 
M - M 
By induction on the complexity of a formula A one shows 
that for all β 
(Mi) И A [a] * M_ И A [a] (2) 
3 о 1* <1> * 3 
From (1) and (2) it follows that for all 3 , 
(M ) |= A [ a] , i.e. M. 1= A [a] . 
3 q.e.d. 
We have seen in theorem I 3.2, that there is a model M 
such that M h= A iff N A. For the case of the proposi-
tional calculus we will give now another proof of this 
theorem. 
Theorem 2.3: For the propositional calculus there is a 
model M, such that for each sentence A, M |= A iff t= A. 
Proof: Let A , A_ , A ,... be an enumeration of the 
formulas of the propositional calculus. Then, as remarked 
in chapter I after theorem 3.7, for each i e IN it is 
decidable whether )= A. or for some M e w not M И A. 
(W is the fan of all models, see I, theorem 2.7). 
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Hence, for each i e IN there is some model M e W, such that 
И A. or not M И A. . Using the countable axiom of 
choice, which is intuitionistically acceptable, we find 
models M. , M„ , M. ,... such that for each i e IN, 
И A. or not Μ. N A. . (*) 
ι i l 
Now, let Μ = .Σ M. (see definition 2.1), 
Proposition : for each formula A , M \= A iff (= A. 
Proof of proposition: From right to left by the definitions. 
Conversely: Suppose A = A and M t= A . Then M |= A. . 
Hence by lemma 2.2 M. И1 A. . 
Hence, by (*) , H A . . q.e.d. 
In theorem 2.4 and 2.5 below, we will prove some 
uniformity properties. 
Theorem 2.4: Let Г be a countably infinite sequence of 
sentences. 
i) If for all A e Г there is a model M e w such that 
not M И A, then there is a model M e w and an 
admissible a, such that for all A e Г not M И Α. 
α 
ii) If for all A e Γ there is a model M e w such that 
if M |= A, then M explodes, then there is a model 
M e w and an admissible a, such that for all 
A e Γ , if M И A, then M explodes. 
Proof: Analogous to the proof of theorem 2.3. 
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I n theorem 2.4 «e have seen, t h a t , for Γ a countably 
i n f i n i t e sequence of sentences, we can interchange 
( A )
 A e г ( E M ) M e W a n d (EM) M e w ( A ) A e r i f t h e P r e d i ^ t e 
i s of t h e form "not Μ N A" o r of the form "if M t= A, 
then M explodes". 
In corollary 3.4 of chapter I we have proved the 
following uniformity result: if (M)
w
 (EA), „„[M 1= A ] , 
M с W А с 1 
then (ЕА)
Д e г
 [ И A ] . 
The proof made use of theorem 1, 3.2, in which one model M 
is given such that, if Μ N A, then |— A. 
Making use only of Brouwer's Continuity Principle and of 
purely semantic methods, we can prove a uniformity result, 
which is a bit stronger: 
Theorem 2.5 : Let Г be a countably infinite sequence of 
sentences. 
i) If for all M e w and for all α there is some A e Γ 
such that M |= A, then there is some A e Γ such that 
α 
t= A, i.e. such that for all M e w and for all α , 
М
а
И Α. 
ii) If for all M e w and for all α there is some A e Г 
such that if M N A , then M И f» then there is some 
а а 
A e Г such that И - A , i.e. such that for all M e W 
and for all a, if Μ N A then Μ N f· 
Proof: analogous to the proof of theorem 1.8. 
85 
Notice that theorem 1.8 (Disjunction property) is a 
consequence of theorem 2.5 (i) : 
Take Γ = {А, В} and suppose \= Α ν В . 
Then the hypothesis of theorem 2.5 (i) is satisfied and 
its conclusion says in this case that И A or h* B. 
In chapter I we have already shown two versions of the 
compactness theorem (corollary I, 3.3 and I, 3.8), making 
use of the proofs of the completeness theorem. 
In theorem 2.6 and 2.7 below, we will prove some other 
versions of compactness, making use of Brouwer's 
Continuity Principle, the fan theorem and purely 
semantic methods. 
Theorem 2.6; Let Г be a countably infinite sequence of 
sentences. 
i) If for all M e W there is some Ac Г such that 
M =^ - A, then there is a sentence A e Г such that 
1= - A. 
ii) If for all M e W there is some A e Г such that, if 
M É= A, then M explodes, then there is some finite 
subset Г' of Г such that for all M e W there is 
some A e Г' with the property, if M f= A, then M 
explodes. 
Remark: In a classical translation, theorem 2.6 says: if 
Г has no model, then there is some finite subset 
Г' of Γ , which has no model. 
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Proof: i) analogous to the proof of theorem 1.8, using 
Brouwer's Continuity Principle and purely 
semantic methods. Another type of proof has 
already been given in corollary 3.4 of chapter I. 
ii) Suppose for all M e W there is some A e Γ such that 
if M N A, then M explodes. 
By the continuity-principle we can conclude: 
For all M e w there is some к e IN and some A e Г, 
such that for all N e w , if Ñk = Mk and N t= A, 
then N explodes. 
By the fan-theorem (W is a fan, see I, theorem 2.7) there 
is some к e IN such that for all M e w there is some A e Г 
such that for all N e w, if Ñk = Mk and N N= A, then N 
explodes. 
Now, there are only finitely many different Mk 
with M e w , say M к ,..., M к. 
Say, to M. we find A. ,..., to M we find A 1 I n η 
Take Γ · = {A, ,..., A } . 
ι η 
Then for all N e w there is some i < n, such that if 
N |= A. , then N explodes. 
In other words: for all M e w there is some A e Γ' 
such that, if Μ N A, then M explodes. 
q.e.d. 
Theorem 2.7: Let Γ be a countably infinite sequence of 
sentences. 
i) If for each finite subset Γ' of Γ there is an M e w 
and an admissible α such that M does not explode and 
for all A e Γ' not M N= -A, then there is a model 
α 
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M e w and some α , such that M does not explode and for 
all A e Γ not M Ь= - Α. 
α
 r
^ 
ii; If for each finite subset Γ' of Γ there is a non-
exploding M e w , such that for all A e Γ' not M И - A, 
then there is a non-exploding model M e w such that for 
all A e Г not M t= - A. 
Remark: In a classical translation this theorem says: if 
each finite subset of Г has a model, then Г has a 
model. 
Proof; Let A , A„ , A.,... be an enumeration of Г 
The proof of i) is a specification of the proof of ii) . 
ii) Suppose for each finite subset Г' of Г there is a 
non-exploding model M e w , such that for all A e Г' 
not M |= - A. 
Suppose , to {A } we find M 
to 
to 
t A
r
A 2 } 
1"^ ' 9 ' 4 
we find M 
we find M 3 
and so on (countable axiom of choice, which 
is intuition!stically acceptable). 
Let M = .£„,.„ M. (see definition 2.1) D ι e IN ι 
Because for all i e IN, M is non-exploding, M is non 
exploding. 
Now suppose A = A. e Г and M H= - Α. . 
Then by lemma 2.2 M. \= - Α.. 
l ' i 
Contradiction with not M. И - A. . 
i i 
Hence, for all A e Г not M (= - A. q.e.d. 
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§3 The semantic independence of the intuitionistic 
connectives V , & ,-»• and - . 
In [ 25] , McKinsey shows by a matrix-type proof that the 
four intuitionistic connectives ν , &, ·*• and - are 
independent. See also [ 28] . It was not clear from his 
paper how the magic matrices were found. However, Krister 
Segerberg gives in [26] a translation of McKinsey's 
matrices in terms of Kripke models, defined on a finite 
set, which is partially ordered, but which does not have 
in all cases a tree structure. 
Making use of the models, defined in chapter I, we will 
prove below, in an intuitionistically correct way, that 
i) -»• is independent of v, & and -
ii) V is independent of &, -*• and -
iii) - is independent of ->• ,v and &. 
In [27] , pp. 59-62, Prawitz shows in a proof-theoretical 
way that the intuitionistic connectives are independent. 
Let P, Q be prepositional variables. 
L (P, Q, V , &, -) is by definition the set of all formulas, 
constructed from P, Q, V , & and - , according to the 
usual rules. In an analogous way one defines L(P, Q, &,->- ,-) , 
L (P,-»-,V, &) and L (P, Q, v, -»-, - ) . 
Def in i t ion 3 . 1 : ->• i s independent of v, & and - = for each 
formula A e L (P, Q, v, &, -) not 
N (P -»• Q) **· A. 
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To prove that -*• is independent of ν , & and - we need 
Lemma 3.2 : If \=- (P -* Q) •> A and A e L (P, Q, V , &, -) , 
then also И (Ρ -* — Q)->· A. 
Proof: 
A = Ρ or A = Q : There is nothing to prove. 
A = В V С : Suppose t= (P ->• Q) -*• В V С. 
Then by theorem 1.11 : 
1= (P -*• Q) ·*• В or N (P -> Q) ->• С 
Then, by induction hypothesis, 
(= (p -> — Q)->- в or N (P -»• — Q) -> С 
Hence N= (P -»• — Q)-* Β ν С. 
A = В Ь С : Suppose Η (Ρ -*• Q) •> В & С . 
Then Ν (Ρ -> Q) ->• Β and 1= (Ρ •*• Q) ·> С. 
By induction hypothesis: 
h= (Ρ ->· — Q) -> В and N (P ->• ~ Q) -*• С 
Hence И (Ρ •*• — Q) -»• В & С. 
А = - В : Suppose Ν (Ρ -»• Q) -> - В. 
Then Ν — (Ρ -> Q) -»• - В. 
Now, Ν (Ρ -*• — Q) -»• — (Ρ -*• Q) 
Hence μ= (Ρ •*• — Q) •*• - В. q.e.d. 
From lemma 3.2 follows 
Theorem 3.3: -*• is independent of v, & and - . 
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Proof: Suppose for some formula A e L (P , Q ,v , &, -) 
|= (P •> Q) «· A. 
Then И (Ρ -> Q) •> A and 1= A -> (P -»• Q) . 
Then, by lemma 3.2, 1= (P ->- —Q)->- A and И A -*• (P -* Q) 
Hence (= (P -> — Q ) -»• (P •> Q) . 
Contradiction. 
q.e.d. 
Definition 3.4: V is independent of &, •*• and - = 
for each formula A e L (P, Q, &, •> , - ) 
not |= Ρ V Q •»•A. 
Theorem 3.5: V is independent of &, ·*• and - . 
Proof: We will give two different proofs: 
i) Let n be one of the connectives v, & , -*• and - . 
Define: D is stable = (= — (А π в) «• — Α α — в. 
Now, & , •*• and - are stable and each connective, 
composed from &, ->• and - is again stable, but V is not 
stable. Hence V is independent of &, -»• and -. 
ii) Let Γ be a set of formulas. By induction on the 
complexity of A we define Γ | A as follows: 
Γ I p π ^ '— P ^P P 1 , 0? 0 5!^ 0 1 1 3! variable) 
Γ | В & С = Г Ι В and Г I С 
Γ Ι Β ν С = (Г I В and Г h-В) or (Г I С and Г Н С ) 
Г | В -> С = if (Г | В and Г |— В) , then Г | С. 
S.C. Kleene proves in corollary 2.7 of [24] , that if 
С | С holds and |— С ->• D V E , then (— С -»• D or |— C->E 
for the intuitionistic propositional calculus. 
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Now, suppose for some formula A e L (P, Q, &,->• , -) 
И Ρ V Q •» A. (1) 
Then И Ρ ·> A and 1= Q -*• A. (2) 
Also 1= A •+ Ρ V Q. 
Because A does not contain V , A | A holds ([24] , 2.13) and 
hence, by Kleene's result and the soundness and 
completeness theorem of chapter I, section 3 it follows 
that |= A •*• Ρ or 1= A -*• Q (3) 
By (2) and (3) : |= A •"· Ρ or h= A •«• Q (4) 
Hence, by (1) and (4) : |= Ρ V Q ** Ρ or \= Ρ V Q **• Q. 
Contradiction. 
q.e.d. 
Definition 3.6: - is independent of &, •*• and V = for 
each formula A e L (P, &, -> , V ) not И - Ρ ** Α. 
Theorem 3.7: - is independent of &, -> and ν . 
Proof: Let M =< S, Τ > be defined by Τ (s)(Ρ) = 1 and 
M M 
T
w
(s)(f) = T,(s)(Q) = 0 for all finite sequences s and 
M M 
for ail propositional variables Q ^ P. 
Then for each formula A e L (P, S, -»-,ν ) and for ail 
a, M H A . 
a 
^n the other hand for all α not M |= - P. 
α 
Hence, there is no formula A e L (P, &, -»• ,V ) such that 
|= - Ρ «* A. 
q.e.d. 
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D e f i n i t i o n 3 . 8 : & i s i n d e p e n d e n t of V , -»• and - = 
f o r each f o r m u l a A e L (P, Q, V,-> , - ) 
n o t И Ρ & Q **• A. 
Unfortunately, I did not succeed in proving, only using 
the semantic concepts of chapter I, that & is independent 
of V , •+• and -. 
I only have two partial results, stated in the following 
two lemma's: 
Lemma 3.9: For each formula A e L (P, Q, -*• , V ) 
not Ν Ρ & Q ** A , in other words: 
& is not expressible in •*· and ν . 
Proof: Suppose for some A e L (P, Q, -*· , ν ) 
|= Ρ & Q «•Α. 
Then for all M e w and for all admissible α 
M 1= Ρ & Q iff M |= Α. (1) 
α α 
Now, consider the following model M: 
Then for all α , not Μ Ν Ρ & Q. (2) 
Proposition: For each A e L (P, Q, ->,v ) there is some α 
such that M |= A. (3) 
α 
93 
Proof of proposition: A = Ρ or A = Q is clear. 
A = В V С : The result is immsdiate from the 
induction hypothesis . 
A = В •*• С : By induction hypothesis there is 
some a such that M |= С. 
a 
By lemma I, 1.4 there is some к e IN, such that for all 
3 through ok, M0 И С and hence also if M (= В, then 
Ρ ρ 
M |= С. So M И В -»• С. 
0 α 
From (1), (2) and (3) follows a contradiction. 
q.e.d. 
Lemma 3.10 : For each formula A e L (P, Q, ν , - ) 
not И Ρ & Q **• A, in other words: 
& is not expressible in V and - . 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
A = Ρ or A = Q : trivial. 
A = В V С: Suppose ^ = P & Q «* B V C . 
Then t= В -*• Ρ & Q and И С -»• Ρ & Q (1) 
By theorem 1.11 also: ( = P & Q ^ B o r | = P & Q ^ C (2) 
From (1) and (2) : И Ρ & Q «•· В or |= Ρ & Q **• С, which 
contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
A = - В : Suppose £= Ρ & Q •** - В . 
Then also |= — (P & Q) *» - В 
Hence t= — (P & Q) •"" Ρ & Q. 
Contradiction. q.e.d. 
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IV A F I R S T S T E P T O W A R D S A N 
I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F 
I N T U I T I O N I S T I C L O G I C I N 
I N T U I T I O N I S T I C A N A L Y S I S 
I f one a s k s an i n t u i t i o n i s t t o g i v e a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e 
a g a i n s t Ρ ν - P , he w i l l p r o b a b l y answer t h a t t h e r e i s 
some s p r e a d σ and some p r e d i c a t e P
w
 , d e f i n e d o v e r t h e 
M M 
spread σ.. , such that not (a) (P
w
 (a) ν - P„ (ο)) , 
Μ α ε a M M 
м 
for example σ„ = σ
η
, and P„ (α) = (En)(α(η) = 0). M U I м 
This suggests the following concept of a model: a model 
M for the intuitionistic propositional calculus is a 
spread σ„ , together with a unary predicate P
w
 over the 
M M 
spread σ„ for each propositional variable P. M 
In [ 6] , page 100-105, S.A. Kripke shows that his 
notion of validity can readily be formulated in terms of 
Kreisel's theory FC of lawless sequences (absolutely free 
choice sequences). 
In this chapter we will formulate our notion of validity 
from section 1 and 2 of chapter I in terms of intuitionistic 
analysis, using the full spread instead of the subspecies 
of all lawless sequences and without using axioms about 
lawless sequences. 
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SI A first step towards an interpretation of 
intuitionistic propositional calculus in 
intuitionistic analysis. 
Notation: For σ a spread, SEQ(a) = {äk|o e σ & к e IN }. 
Definition 1.1: A model M =< σ , (PJ) >. „. for the M i M i e IN 
intuitionistic propositional calculus is a spread σ , 
M 
together with unary predicates (P.),. (i ε IN) over the 
spread σ , such that for each i e IN, (P.).. : ΞΕΟ(σ„) -»• 
Μ ι м м 
{0,1} and such that if (P.), (ok) = 1 , then 
ι и (р.)
м
 (Sk+i) = 1. 
д. M 
Remark: The predicates over σ , associated with the 
~~
ш
—^•~~~" M 
functions P„ : SEQ(a
w
) -*- { 0,1} are predicates of a very M M 
special type: 
The intended interpretation of Ρ (ak) = 1 is: 
I know on the ground of ak that α has the property Ρ , 
M 
more precisely, for all В , if ¡3k = ok , then 3 has the 
property PM . 
Μ ¡= Ρ [α] will mean that P
w
(ak) = 1 for some к e IN, 
M 
i.e. that there is an initial segment of α on the ground 
of which I know that a has the property Ρ 
M 
So we exclude for example the predicate Q(a) = (n)(a(n) = 0): 
let о be defined by о (к) = о for all к e IN; then Q(o) holds, 
but we do not know Q(o) on the ground of an initial segment 
ok of о . 
This is the reason why we speak of "a first step towards an 
interpretation of intuitionistic logic in intuitionistic 
analysis". 
There may be a whole hierarchy of predicates over a spread. 
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Note that in definition 1.2, below, f is a prepositional 
symbol (absurdity), while f : SEQ(a
w
) -> {0,1} . 
M M 
Definition 1.2; Let M =< σ , (P.)
w
> i e IN be a model 
— ^ " ^ • " M л. M 
and let α ea
w
 . 
M 
M fc= f [ α] = f (ök) = 1 for some к e IN. 
D M 
M И A [ α] = 
1. M |= f [ α] or 
2. A = Ρ and P„ (ak) = 1 for some к e IN, or 
M 
3. A = Β ν С and (M И В [ a] or M И С [ а] ) , or 
4. А = В & С and (M (= В [ α] and M |= С [ α] ) , or 
5. A = В ·*• С and there is some к e IN such that for all 
β , if ßk = ak and Μ |= Β [ β] , then M h С [ β] . 
Definition 1.3: Let M = < σ„ , (Ρ. ).. > . ,.„ be a model. 
м ι M ie IN 
M ^=А = м \= A [a] for ail α e σ . 
Lemma 1.4: M H A [ α] iff there is some к e IN, such that 
for all β , if ßk = ük, then M И A [ β] . 
Proof: by induction on the complexity of A. 
Remark: Let A(P, Q) be a formula with Ρ and Q as the only 
propositional symbols. 
In chapter I a model M assigns to each propositional symbol 
Ρ a basic sentence M(P) over the natural numbers and gives 
at the same time a possible development of our knowledge 
about those sentences. 
M И» A(Ρ, Q) means in chapter I that searching along the 
search path α I will find a proof of the sentence 
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A(M(P) , M(Q)) , which results from the formula A(P, Q) 
by substituting for Ρ and Q the sentences M(P) and M(Q) 
over the natural numbers. 
In this chapter IV we have changed our terminology: 
the search path α along which we search for a proof of 
M(P), has been replaced by an element α of a spread 
which may have the property Ρ on the ground of an 
M 
initial segment of g. 
Μ |= A(Ρ, Q) [a] means in this chapter IV that there is an 
initial segment of α , on the ground of which I know that 
о has the property A„ = A(P„ , Q„), which results from 
M M M 
the formula A(P, Q) by substituting for the prepositional 
symbols Ρ and Q the predicates Ρ and Q
w
 over σ,, . 
M M M 
And M |= A(P, Q) then means t h a t for a l l α , M И A(P,Q) 
[α] , i . e . t h a t for a l l α e σ t h e r e i s an i n i t i a l 
M 
segment of a, on the ground of which I know that α has the 
property A M = A(PM , Q M). 
Because the notion of validity of this chapter IV results 
from the notion of validity of chapter I by just changing 
terminology, the notions of chapter I and IV are formally 
equivalent, as will be explicitly stated in theorem 2.2. 
The purpose of this chapter IV is simply to show that the 
notion of validity of chapter I can be formulated in 
terms of intuitionistic analysis without admitting lawless 
sequences in our ontology and without using axioms about 
lawless sequences, which Kripke [ 6] has to use in order to 
be able to formulate his semantics in intuitionistic analysis. 
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Namely, given a model M, Kripke defines for each 
propositional variable Ρ and for each lawless sequence о : 
Ρ(α) = for some к e IN, М И Ρ 
and 
(В & С) (α) = В (α) & С(а) 
(В ν С)(а) g В (α) ν С(а) 
(В •*• С) (а) = В (а) -> С(а) 
In order to prove that, for a finite sequence s of natural 
numbers, 
M И В -*• С iff for all lawless sequences α through s , 
s 
В(а) -»• С (а) 
Kripke needs the following axiom about lawless sequences a: 
В(a) iff there is some к e IN such that for all lawless 
sequences β, if ßk = ак, then B(ß) . 
Because, in this paper, validity is defined in arbitrary 
infinitely proceeding sequences and not in nodes as in 
Kripke models and because of our definition of 
M h- В -»• С [ о] , we were able to formulate our semantics 
directly in terms of intuitionistic analysis, with 
M И A [ α] instead of Kripke's А(а) , using the full 
spread instead of the subspecies of all lawless sequences 
and without using axioms about lawless sequences. 
Hence we do not have to admit lawless sequences in our 
ontology. 
In Kripke's interpretation of [ 6] over all lawless 
sequences all predicates are admitted; in the interpretation 
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over all choice sequences of this chapter we only admit 
predicates of a special type. 
In Kripke's paper [6] ' (В •> С) (α) ' is defined by 
'Βζα) ->• С (α) ' , α a lawless sequence, and it has the 
appropriate properties by the axiom, mentioned above, 
for lawless sequences. 
In this chapter 'MN=B->-C[a] ',a a choice sequence, 
has the appropriate properties by convention (definition 1.2). 
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§2 A first step towards an interpretation of 
intuitionistic predicate calculus in intuitionistic 
analysis. 
Consider a language with predicate symbols P. , i e IN; 
suppose P. is T(i)-ary, Ρ is o-ary and let f = Ρ 
Definition 2.1: A model M = 
ΓΙ * f a · · « Ti , , \ 
< a , (Ρ.) 1 τ ( ι ) > , is 
M ' i M i, η. ,..., η ...e IN 1 τ(ι) 
a spread σ , together with unary predicates M 
nl ' • · " ητ(1) (P.)M (i, η ,..., η e IN) over the 
spread σ , such that for each i, n. ,..., η ... e IN 
Μ 1 τ(1) 
nl »···» nTfi) 
(P.)„ : SEQ(a ) -»• { 0,1} and such that if 
1 M M 
(Р.)
м
 1 Т ( І )
 (Â) = 1, then (Р.)
м
 1 τ ( ι ) 
I M I M 
(ak+l) = 1. 
So, for example, a binary predicate symbol Ρ is 
о,o o,1 1 ,o interpreted as a sequence Ρ » P„ > P.. 
М М М 
„ 1,1 „ 2,0 „ 0,2 „ 2,1 ^ ,, ^ 
P M / PM '
 Р
м ' M ' *'" unary predicates 
over σ . 
M 
The intended meaning of M И P(v,w ) [η, m,α] is, that 
there is an initial segment of α , on the ground of which 
I know that α has the property Ρ ' 
M 
Let M be a model, α e σ„ , A(v. ,..., ν ) a formula and 
M l m 
let n. ,..., η e IN. 1 m 
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M И A(v. ,..., ν ) [ η. ,..., η ,α] is defined 1 m l m 
completely analogous to the definition of M |= A.{v.,•..,ν ) 
In. ,..., η ] in definition 2.2 of chapter I. 1 m 
For Ρ a binary predicate symbol, the intended meaning of 
Μ |= (χ) Ρ(χ, y) [ m,α] is that there is an initial 
segment of a, on the ground of which I know that for 
each η e IN о has the property Ρ ' 
Ά 
Analogous to definition 2.3 of chapter I we define: 
M И A(v ,..., ν ) t η ,..., η ] = 
1 m l m D 
M H= A(v, ,.../ ν ) [ n. ,..., η ,α] for all α εσ„ . 
ι m ι m м 
And by induct ion on the complexity of A one proves the 
analogue of lemma 2.4 of chapter I : 
M И A(v. , . . . , ν ) [ n. , . . . , η , a ] i f f t h e r e i s some 1 m l m 
к e IN such t h a t for a l l β e a
w
 , i f (Зк = ok, then 
M 
, ν ) [η ,..., η β] . 
m l m 
In theorem 2.2 below we state explicitly that the notions 
of validity of chapter I and of this chapter IV are 
formally equivalent. So, only the intended meaning is 
expressed in a different way. 
Theorem 2.2; 
i) Let M = < S
w
 , Τ > be a model in the sense of 
M M 
definition 2.1 of chapter I. 
ni '··" пт(і) Define N = <S„ , (P.)„ ι *·>-'> 
N 1 N
 ι, η ,..., η ...e IN 
as follows: 1 τ M 
S = S N D M 
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'VN1
 Т(І)
 Cak)
 S тм ( 5 к ) ( < р і ' пі »
Т
( І ) » 
Then N is a model in the sense of definition 2.1 of this 
chapter IV and for all α 
N И Α (ν ,..., ν ) [η ,..., η ,α ]iff 1 m l m 
Μ И A (ν ,..., ν ) [ η ,..., η ] 
α 1 m l m 
п^ f , . ш г η ... 
ii) Let Ν = < S M , (Р.)м
 Т(
 '> . 
Ν ι Ν ι, η. , ... , η ...β IN 1 τ(ι) 
be a model in the sense of definition 2.1 of this 
chapter IV. 
Define M = < S
w
 , Τ > as follows: M M 
s = s 
M D Ν 
Τ
Μ
 (dk)( <Р
І
 , n1 η τ ( 1 )> ) = 1 g 
η. , . . . , η . .. 
(ρ.)' τ ( ι ) (5k) = ι. 
Χ Ν 
Then Μ is a model in the sense of definition 2.1 
of chapter I and for all α 
Ν Μ A (v. ,..., ν ) [n, ,..., η , ώ] iff 
1 m l m 
Μ Η Α (ν ,..., ν ) [ η , ..., η J 
α ϊ m i m 
Proof: immediate from the definitions. 
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§3 Discussion. 
One can actually give two reasons for the invalidity 
of Ρ V - Ρ : 
1. not (α) ( (En) (an = ο) ν - (En) (α η = о) ), 
a e σ01 
using Brouwer's continuity-principle. 
2. not M |= Ρ V - Ρ, where M = < σ
η
, , P
w
 > as defined in 
01 M 
the following picture: 
i.e. P„ (ôik) = 1 iff (El). .. (a (1) = 0), hence 
(Ek) (PM (5k) = 1) iff (En) (a (n) = 0). 
For a the right-most element of σ.. , i.e. a(k) = 1 
for all k e IN, we have not Μ =^ Ρ [ α] and not 
M ^ - Ρ [α], because if M H - Ρ [ α] , then by 
definition there was some k e IN, such that for all 
0 through ok not Μ Η Ρ [ ß] » which is not the case. 
The first argument does, but the second argument does not 
make explicitly use of Brouwer's Continuity Principle. 
In the second argument we have put the effect of Brouwer's 
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Continuity Principle for an invidual choice-sequence into 
the definition of Μ N A [ o] . 
In an analogous way one can give two reasons for the 
invalidity of — Ρ -*• Ρ; these two reasons are less similar 
than the reasons, we gave for the invalidity of Ρ ν - P. 
1. substituting Q V - Q for P, — (Q V - Q) ->• (Q V - Q) 
is not valid, using again Brouwer's continuity 
principle. 
2. not M И — Ρ ->- Ρ with M =< σ
η4 , Ρ > as 
01 M 
defined before. 
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S a m e n v a t t i n g 
In de literatuur zijn diverse voorstellen gedaan voor 
een adaequate waarheidsdefinitie voor formules van de 
intuitionistische logica. In dit proefschrift wordt een 
nieuwe, intuitionistisch plausibele, waarheidsdefinitie 
geïntroduceerd, die diverse voordelen van technische aard 
blijkt op te leveren, vergeleken met de reeds bekende 
semantieken. 
Terwijl men gewoonlijk de studie van de intuitionis-
tische logica bedrijft in een klassieke metataal, wordt in 
dit proefschrift overal, zonder uitzondering, een intui-
tionistische metataal gehanteerd. Een aantal problemen die 
dit met zich meebrengt, zoals bijvoorbeeld het bewijzen 
van de disjunctie-eigenschap, zijn in dit proefschrift 
opgelost. 
Het proefschrift bevat een intuitionistisch bewijs 
van de volledigheidsstelling en van diverse compactheids-
stellingen, gebruik makende van een generalisatie van het 
begrip "model" voor een intuitionistisch systeem, zoals 
dit door drs. W.H.M. Veldman is ontwikkeld. 
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S T E L L I N G E N 
I FILOSOFISCHE LOGICA 
1 Evenals het nominalisme van N. Goodman, zoals dat in de onderstaande 
literatuur beschreven wordt, heeft ook het intuitionisme kritiek op het 
wetenschappelijk taalgebruik, met name met betrekking tot quantificatie 
over de collectie van alle verzamelingen. Echter, de beperkingen die N. 
Goodman oplegt aan het wetenschappelijk taalgebruik, blijken nauwe-
lijks uitvoerbaar. Brouwer's quantificatie over de elementen van een 
spreiding blijkt daarentegen wel een practisch uitvoerbaar, partieel, alter-
natief te bieden en geeft bovendien een veel diepere analyse van de 
betreffende problemen dan Goodman's nominalisme. Zie: N. Goodman 
and W. Quine, Steps towards a constructive nominalism. The Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, vol. 12, 1947, pp. 105-22. 
N. Goodman, The structure of appearance. Harvard University Press, 
1951. 
N. Goodman, A world of individuals. In P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, 
Philosophy of Mathematics. 
H. Putnam, Philosophy of logic. 
2 N. Goodman's nominalisme heeft problemen met de quantificatie die 
voorkomt in de formulering van 'A is intuïtief geldig'. Echter, hoewel in 
Ά is intuïtief geldig'een quantificatie voorkomt, welke geen quantifica-
tie over de elementen van een spreiding is, begrijpt een intuitionist naar 
mijn mening wat hij bedoelt met 'als A afleidbaar is, dan is A intuïtief 
geldig', omdat de genoemde quantificatie voorkomt in het succedens van 
de implicatie. Maar om de betekenis van de omgekeerde bewering 'als A 
geldig is, dan is A afleidbaar' te kunnen begrijpen, moet een intuitionist 
zich beperken tot een quantificatie over de elementen van een spreiding, 
zoals in feite gedaan wordt in het begrip ' HA' van dit proefschrift. 
Zie de literatuur, vermeld bij 1. 
3 Het contrast tussen 'platonisme' en intuitionisme komt in wezen reeds 
voor in het commentaar van Proclos (± 450 na Christus) op het eerste 
boek van de Elementen van Euclides, waarin onderscheid wordt gemaakt 
tussen Speusippos en de zijnen (± 350 voor Christus), volgens welke alle 
constructie-opgaven theorema's zijn en Menaichmos en de mensen om 
hem heen (± 350 voor Christus), volgens welke alle theorema's construc-
tie-opgaven zijn. Zie Paul Ver Eecke, Proclus de Lycie, les commentaires 
sur Ie premier livre des éléments d'Euclide, biz. 69-70. 
II INTUITIONISTISCHE ANALYSE 
4 Een volledige, totaal beperkte, metrische ruimte kan worden gerepresen­
teerd door een waaier. Dientengevolge geldt voor een dergelijke ruimte 
(E,p): 
i) ledere f : E •*• IR is uniform continu op E. 
ii) Zij voor iedere η e IN, f n : E •* IR. 
Als er voor iedere χ e E een y e IR is, zodanig dat lim f
 n (x) = y, dan is 
n-H» n 
er een functie g : E-HR zodanig dat Mm unif f = g . 
n-H» E n 
5 Voor (E, p) een totaal beperkte, metrische ruimte zij C(E) de verzame­
ling van alle uniform continue functies f : E - 4 R. 
C(E) kan worden gerepresenteerd door een spreiding, welke geen waaier 
is en (C(E), d), met d gedefinieerd door d(f,g) = Bf—gl, is een volledige 
metrische ruimte. 
6 Stelling van Stone-Weierstrass: zij (E, p) een volledige, totaal beperkte, 
metrische ruimte. Als A een deel-algebra is van C(E), die de constante 
functies bevat en die de punten van E scheidt, dan is A dicht in C(E). 
N.B. A scheidt de punten van E = voor alle x, y e E, als χ # y, dan is er 
een f e A zodanig dat f(x) # f ( y ) . 
Gevolg: Als (E, p) een volledige, totaal beperkte, metrische ruimte is, 
dan is (C(E), d) separabel. 
Ill Hilary Putnam's boekje 'Philosophy of Logic' zou aanzienlijk grotere 
diepgang gehad hebben, indien hij ook het intuitionisme in zijn be­
schouwingen had betrokken. 
H. de Swart Nijmegen, 2 april 1976 




